THE LAW OF NATIONS
OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
IN FOUR BOOKS (1758) By EMMERICH DE VATTEL Translated into English by Joseph Chitty, Esq. (1833) Spelling has been modernized. This electronic edition
© Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute
(Kingery. [K.] Notes: Spelling is pobably Modernized to 1833 or perhaps 2003.)
(K. Notes: Will appear in this style; indented and usually below the paragraph with which it is associated.)
(K. Notes: This Annotated Work is by Daniel Kingery. Table of Contents and page number will not match previously published works. 2022)
Table of Contents
Preface to 1852 Edition 1
Advertisement to The 1797 Edition 1
Preface to The 1797 Edition 1
Preface to The 1833 Edition 1
1758 Preface (by Vattel) 1
Preliminaries: Idea and General Principles of the Law of Nations 1
§ 1. What is meant by a nation or state. 1
§ 2. It is a moral person. 2
§ 3. Definition of the law of nations. 2
§ 4. In what light nations or states are to be considered. 2
§ 5. To what laws nations are subject. 2
§ 6. In what the law of nations originally consists. 2
§ 7. Definition of the necessary law of nations. 2
§ 8. It is immutable. 2
§ 9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the obligations arising from it. 2
§ 10. Society established by nature between all mankind. 2
§ 11. And between all nations. 2
§ 12. The object of this society of nations. 2
§ 13. General obligation imposed by it. 2
§ 14. Explanation of this observation. 2
§ 15. The second general law is the liberty and independence of nations.
§ 16. Effect of that liberty.
§ 17. Distinctions between internal and external, perfect and imperfect obligations and rights.
§ 18. Equality of nations.
§ 19. Effect of that equality.
§ 20. Each nation is mistress of her own actions, when they do not affect the perfect rights of others.
§ 21. Foundation of the voluntary law of nations.
§ 22. Right of nations against the infractors of the law of nations.
§ 23. Measure of that right.
§ 24. Conventional law of nations, or law of treaties.
§ 25. Customary law of nations.
§ 26. General rule respecting that law.
§ 27. Positive law of nations.
§ 28. General maxim respecting the use of the necessary and the voluntary law.
BOOK 1: Of Nations Considered in Themselves
CHAPTER 1: Of Nations or Sovereign States 2
§ 1. Of the state, and of sovereignty 2
§ 2. Authority of the body politic over the members. 2
§ 3. Of the several kinds of government. 2
§ 4. What are sovereign states. 2
§ 5. States bound by unequal alliance. 2
§ 6. Or by treaties of protection. 2
§ 7. Of tributary states. 2
§ 8. Of feudatory states. 2
§ 9. Of two states subject to the same prince. 2
§ 10. Of states forming a federal republic. 2
§ 11. Of a state that has passed under the dominion of another. 2
§ 12. The objects of this treatise. 2
CHAPTER 2: General Principles of the Duties of a Nation Towards Itself 2
§ 13. A nation ought to act agreeably to its nature. 2
§ 14. Of the preservation and perfection of a nation. 2
§ 15. What is the end of civil society. 2
§ 16. A nation is under an obligation to preserve itself. 2
§ 17. And to preserve its members. 2
§ 18. A nation has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation. 2
§ 19. It ought to avoid every thing that might occasion its destruction. 2
§ 20. Of its right to every thing that may promote this end. 2
§ 21. A nation ought to perfect itself and the state. 2
§ 22. And to avoid every thing contrary to its perfection. 2
§ 23. The rights it derives from these obligations. 2
§ 24. Examples. 2
§ 25. A nation ought to know itself. 2
CHAPTER 3: Of the Constitution of a State, and the Duties and Rights of the Nation in this Respect 2
§ 26. Of public authority. 2
§ 27. What is the constitution of a state. 2
§ 28. The nation ought to choose the best constitution. 2
§ 29. Of political, fundamental, and civil laws. 2
§ 30. Of the support of the constitution and obedience to the laws. 3
§ 31. The rights of a nation with respect to its constitution and government. 3
§ 32. It may reform the government. 3
§ 33. And may change the constitution. 3
§ 34. Of the legislative power, and whether it can change the constitution. 3
§ 35. The nation ought not to attempt it without great caution. 3
§ 36. It is the judge of all disputes relating to the government. 3
§ 37. No foreign power has a right to interfere. 3
CHAPTER 4: Of the Sovereign, His Obligations, and His Rights 3
§ 38. Of the sovereign. 3
§ 39. It is solely established for the safety and advantage of society. 3
§ 40. Of his representative character. 3
§ 41. He is intrusted with the obligations of the nation, and invested with its rights. 3
§ 42 His duty with respect to the preservation and perfection of the nation. 3
§ 43. His rights in this respect. 3
§ 44. He ought to know the nation. 3
§ 45. The extent of his power. Prerogatives of majesty. 3
§ 46. The prince ought to respect and support the fundamental laws. 3
§ 47. He may change the laws not fundamental. 3
§ 48. He ought to maintain and observe the existing laws. 3
§ 49. In what sense he is subject to the laws. 3
§ 50. His person is sacred and inviolable. 3
§ 51. But the nation may curb a tyrant, and withdraw itself from his obedience. 3
§ 52. Arbitration between the king and his subjects. 3
§ 53. The obedience which subjects owe to a sovereign. 3
§ 54. In what cases they may resist him. 3
§ 55. Of ministers. 3
CHAPTER 5: Of States Elective, Successive or Hereditary, and of Those Called Patrimonial 3
§ 56 Of elective states. 3
CHAPTER 6: Principal Objects of a Good Government; and First to Provide for the Necessities of the Nation 4
§ 72. The object of society points out the duties of the sovereign. 4
CHAPTER 7: Of The Cultivation of The Soil 4
§ 77. The utility of tillage. 4
CHAPTER 8: Of Commerce 4
§ 83. Of home and foreign trade. 4
CHAPTER 9: Of the Care of the Public Ways of Communication, and the Right of Toll 4
§ 100. Utility of highways, canals, etc. 4
CHAPTER 10: Of Money and Exchange 4
§ 105. Establishment of money. 4
CHAPTER 11: Second Object of a Good Government, — to Procure the True Happiness of the Nation 4
§ 110. A nation ought to labor after its own happiness. 4
CHAPTER 12: Of Piety and Religion 5
§ 125. Of piety. 5
CHAPTER 13: Of Justice And Polity 6
§ 158. A nation ought to make justice reign. 6
CHAPTER 14: The Third Object of a Good Government, — To Fortify Itself Against External Attacks
§ 177. A nation ought to fortify itself against external attacks. 6
CHAPTER 15: Of the Glory of a Nation 6
§ 186. Advantages of glory. 6
CHAPTER 16: Of the Protection Sought by a Nation, and Its Voluntary Submission to a Foreign Power 6
§ 192. Protection. 6
CHAPTER 17: How a Nation May Separate Itself from the State of Which it Is a Member, or Renounce its Allegiance to its Sovereign When it Is Not Protected 6
§ 200. Difference between the present case and those in the preceding chapter. 6
CHAPTER 18: Of the Establishment of a Nation in a Country 6
§ 203. Possession of a country by a nation. 6
CHAPTER 19: Of Our Native Country, and Several Things That Relate to It 7
§ 211. What is our country. 7
CHAPTER 20: Of Public, Common, and Private Property 7
§ 234. What the Romans called res communes. 7
CHAPTER 21: Of the Alienation of the Public Property, or the Domain, and That of a Part of the State 7
§ 257. The nation may alienate its public property. 7
CHAPTER 22: Of Rivers Streams, and Lakes 8
§ 266. A river that separates two territories. 8
CHAPTER 23: Of the Sea 8
§ 279. The sea, and its use. 8
BOOK 2: Of a Nation Considered in its Relation to Others 8
CHAPTER 1: Of the Common Duties of a Nation Towards Others; Or, of the Offices of Humanity Between Nations 8
§ 1. Foundation of the common and mutual duties of nations. 8
CHAPTER 2: Of the Mutual Commerce Between Nations 9
§ 21. General obligation of nations to carry on mutual commerce. 9
CHAPTER 3: Of the Dignity and Equality of Nations — of Titles and Other Marks of Honor 9
§ 35. Dignity of nations or sovereign states. 9
CHAPTER 4: Of The Right to Security, And The Effects of The Sovereignty And Independence of Nations 9
§ 49. Right to security. 9
CHAPTER 5: Of the Observance of Justice Between Nations 9
§ 63. Necessity of the observance of justice in human society. 9
CHAPTER 6: Of the Concern a Nation May Have in the Actions of Her Citizens 10
§ 71. The sovereign ought to revenge the injuries of the state, and to protect the citizens. 10
CHAPTER 7: Effects of the Domain Between Nations 10
§ 79. General effect of the domain. 10
CHAPTER 8: Rules with Respect to Foreigners 10
§ 99. General idea of the conduct the state ought to observe towards foreigners. 10
CHAPTER 9: Of the Rights Retained by All Nations after the Introduction of Domain and Property 11
§ 116. What are the rights of which men cannot be deprived. 11
CHAPTER 10: How a Nation Is to Use Her Right of Domain, in Order to Discharge Her Duties Towards Other Nations, with Respect to the Innocent Use of Things 11
§ 131. General duty of the proprietor. 11
CHAPTER 11: Of Usucaption and Prescription Among Nations 11
§ 140. Definition of usucaption and prescription. 11
CHAPTER 12: Of Treaties of Alliance, and Other Public Treaties 11
§ 152. Nature of treaties. 11
CHAPTER 13: Of the Dissolution and Renewal of Treaties1 12
§ 198. Expiration of alliances made for a limited time. 12
CHAPTER 14: Of Other Public Conventions, — of Those That Are Made by Subordinate Powers, — Particularly of the Agreement Called in Latin Sponsio, — and of Conventions of Sovereigns with Private Persons 13
§ 206. Conventions made by sovereigns. 13
CHAPTER 15: Of the Faith of Treaties 13
§ 218. What is sacred among nations. 13
CHAPTER 16: Of Securities Given for the Observance of Treaties 13
§ 235. Guaranty. 13
CHAPTER 17: Of the Interpretation of Treaties 14
§ 262. Necessity of establishing rules of interpretation. 14
CHAPTER 18: Of The Mode of Terminating Disputes Between Nations 15
§ 323. General direction on this subject. 15
BOOK 3: Of War 16
CHAPTER 1: Of War, — Its Different Kinds — and the Right of Making War 16
§ 1. Definition of war. 16
CHAPTER 2: Of the Instruments of War, — the Raising of Troops, Etc., — Their Commanders, or the Subordinate Powers in War 16
§ 6. Instruments of war. 16
CHAPTER 3: Of the Just Causes of War 16
§ 24. War never to be undertaken without very cogent reasons. 16
CHAPTER 4: Of the Declaration of War — and of War in Due Form 17
§ 51. Declaration of war. 17
CHAPTER 5: Of the Enemy, and of Things Belonging to the Enemy 17
§ 69. Who is an enemy. 17
CHAPTER 6: Of the Enemy's Allies — of Warlike Associations — of Auxiliaries and Subsidies 17
§ 78. Treaties relative to war. 17
CHAPTER 7: Of Neutrality — and the Passage of Troops Through a Neutral Country 18
§ 103. Neutral nations. 18
CHAPTER 8: Of the Rights of Nations in War, — And, First, of What We Have a Right to Do, and What We Are Allowed to Do to the Enemy's Person, in a Just War 18
§ 136. General principles of the rights against an enemy in a just war. 18
CHAPTER 9: Of the Right of War, with Regard to Things Belonging to the Enemy 19
§ 160. Principles of the right over things belonging to the enemy. 19
CHAPTER 10: Of Faith Between Enemies, — of Stratagems, Artifices in War, Spies, and Some Other Practices 20
§ 174. Faith to be sacred between enemies. 20
CHAPTER 11: Of the Sovereign Who Wages an Unjust War 20
§ 183. An unjust war gives no right whatever. 20
CHAPTER 12: Of the Voluntary Law of Nations, as it Regards the Effects of Regular Warfare, Independently of the Justice of the Cause 20
§ 188. Nations not rigidly to enforce the law of nature against each other 20
CHAPTER 13: Of Acquisitions by War, and Particularly of Conquests 20
§ 193. How war is a method of acquisition. 20
CHAPTER 14: Of the Right of Postliminium 21
§ 204. Definition of the right of postliminium 21
CHAPTER 15: Of the Right of Private Persons in War 21
§ 223. Subjects cannot commit hostilities without the sovereign's order. 21
CHAPTER 16: Of Various Conventions Made During the Course of the War 21
§ 233. Truce and suspension of arms. 21
CHAPTER 17: Of Safe-conducts and Passports, — With Questions on the Ransom of Prisoners of War 22
§ 265. Nature of safe-conducts and passports. 22
CHAPTER 18: Of Civil War 22
§ 287 Foundation of the sovereign's rights against the rebels. 22
BOOK 4: Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies 22
CHAPTER 1: Of Peace, and the Obligation to Cultivate it 22
§ l. What peace is. 22
CHAPTER 2: Treaties of Peace 22
§ 9. Definition of a treaty of peace. 22
CHAPTER 3: Of the Execution of the Treaty of Peace 23
§ 24. When the obligation of the treaty commences. 23
CHAPTER 4: Of the Observance and Breach of the Treaty of Peace 23
§ 35. The treaty of peace binds the nation and successors. 23
CHAPTER 5: Of the Right of Embassy, or the Right of Sending and Receiving Public Ministers 23
§ 55. It is necessary that nations be enabled to treat and communicate together. 23
CHAPTER 6: Of the Several Orders of Public Ministers — Of the Representative Character — and of the Honor Due to Ministers 23
§ 69. Origin of the several orders of public ministers. 23
CHAPTER 7: Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers 24
§ 80. Respect due to public ministers.2 24
CHAPTER 8: Of the Judge of Ambassadors in Civil Cases 25
§ 110. The ambassador is exempt from the civil jurisdiction of the country where he resides. 25
CHAPTER 9: Of the Ambassador's House and Domestics 25
§ 117. The ambassador's house.1 25
Preface to 1852 Edition
The text of the present translation of Vattel has been carefully compared with that of the original work, in the first edition which appeared, (Londres, 1758, 2 vol. in quarto,) published at Neufchatel; in that of Amsterdam, (Van Harrevelt, 1775, 2 vol. in quarto,) the best known till recently; and in that of M. de Hoffmans, (Paris, 1839, 2 vol. in octavo,) the last and best edition. Great care has been taken also in regard to the British decisions cited by the English editor. It was discovered, that many inaccuracies existed in the citations, particularly in the names of the cases cited, which have been corrected by references to the original reports of the decisions: and wherever it appeared that the notes of the English editor required additions to render the doctrine advanced in them clearer, or more intelligible, such additions have been made; care having been taken to distinguish the matter added by enclosing it in brackets. The editor regrets very much that the size of the volume — which would have been too much increased by such an extension — did not permit him to annex to it the "Bibliographie choisie et systematique du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, et du Droit Public," of M. de Hoffmans, which is an excellent guide in the choice of Works upon a subject much less attended to than is demanded by its importance.
Philadelphia, Sept. 29,1852.
Advertisement to The 1797 Edition
IN undertaking this new edition of Monsieur De Vattel's treatise, it was not my intention to give what might strictly be called a new translation. To add the author's valuable notes from the posthumous edition, printed at Neufchatel in 1773, — to correct some errors I had observed in the former version, — and occasionally to amend the language where doubtful or obscure, — were the utmost limits of my original plan. As I proceeded, however, my alterations became more numerous; but whether they will be acknowledged as amendments, it must rest with the reader to determine.Even if this decision should be more favorable than I have any reason to expect, I lay no claim to praise for my humble efforts, but shall esteem myself very fortunate if I escape the severity of censure for presenting the work to the public in a state still so far short of perfection. Conscious of its defects, I declare, with great sincerity, — ... Veniam pro laude peto, — laudatus abunde, Non fastiditus si tibi, lector, ero.
London, May 1, 1797.
Preface to The 1797 Edition
THE merits and increasing utility of this admirable work have not, as yet, been sufficiently known, or justly appreciated. It has been generally supposed that it is only adapted for the study of sovereigns and statesmen, and in that view certainly the author's excellent Preface points out its preeminent importance. But it is of infinitely more extended utility. It contains a practical collection of ethics, principles, and rules of conduct to be observed and pursued, as well by private individuals as by states, and these of the utmost practical importance to the well-being, happiness, and ultimate and permanent advantage and benefit of all mankind; and, therefore, ought to be studied by every gentleman of liberal education, and by youth, in whom the best moral principles should be inculcated. The work should be familiar in the Universities, and in every class above the inferior ranks of society. And, as regards lawyers, it contains the clearest rules of construing private contracts, and respecting the Admiralty and Insurance Law. The positions of the author, moreover, have been so sensibly and clearly supported and explained, and so happily illustrated by historical and other interesting examples, that the perusal cannot fail to entertain as well as instruct. The present Editor, therefore, affirms, without the hazard of contradiction, that every one who has attentively read this work, will admit that he has acquired a knowledge of superior sentiments and more important information than he ever derived from any other work.
Preface to The 1833 Edition
Many years have elapsed since the original work was published, long before the invaluable decisions of Sir William Scott, Sir C. Robinson, and Sir John Nichol, and other eminent Judges in the Courts of Admiralty, and Prize and other Courts; and the last edition upon which any care was bestowed, was published in A.D. 1797; since which time, and especially during the last general war, many most important rules respecting the Law of Nations were established. The object of the present Editor has, therefore, been to collect and condense, in numerous notes, the modern rules and decisions, and to fortify the positions in the text by references to other authors of eminence, and by which he hopes that this edition will be found of more practical utility, without interfering with the text, or materially increasing its size.
The Editor had proposed to form an Index, so as to render the work more readily accessible; but, in that desire, he has been overruled by the publishers, who think that the exceedingly full Analytical Table of Contents following the Preface, and naming the pages where each position is to be found, are sufficient, without increasing the bulk of the work, and, consequently, the expense. The Editor hopes that the student who may examine his numerous notes will not think that he has wasted time.
Chambers, 6, Chancery Lane, November, 1833
1758 Preface (by Vattel)
THE Law of Nations, though so noble and important a subject, has not, hitherto, been treated of with all the care it deserves. The greater part of mankind have, therefore, only a vague, a very incomplete, and often even a false notion of it. The generality of writers, and even celebrated authors, almost exclusively confine the name of "Law of Nations" to certain maxims and treatises recognized among nations, and which the mutual consent of the parties has rendered obligatory on them. This is confining within very narrow bounds a law so extensive in its own nature, and in which the whole human race are so intimately concerned; it is, at the same time, a degradation of that law, in consequence of a misconception of its real origin.
(K. Notes: What Vattel says here is equally true of The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, especially when we refer to that document as The Declaration of Independence.)
There certainly exists a natural law of nations, since the obligations of the law of nature are no less binding on states, on men united in political society, than on individuals. But, to acquire an exact knowledge of that law, it is not sufficient to know what the law of nature prescribes to the individuals of the human race. The application of a rule to various subjects, can no otherwise be made than in a manner agreeable to the nature of each subject. Hence, it follows, that the natural law of nations is a particular science, consisting in a just and rational application of the law of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations or sovereigns. All treatises, therefore, in which the law of nations is blended and confounded with the ordinary law of nature, are incapable of conveying a distinct idea, or a substantial knowledge of the sacred law of nations.
(K. Notes: What Vattel states here, especially with the phrase, “Hence, it follows, that the natural law of nations is a particular science, consisting in a just and rational application of the law of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations or sovereigns” is exactly what Jefferson and contributors to The unanimous Declaration have accomplished. The Declaration is a binding contract among the body-Sovereign, which is the body of the governed people.)
The Romans often confounded the law of nations with the law of nature, giving the name of "the lawof nations" (Jus Gentium) to the law of nature, as being generally acknowledged and adopted by all civilized nations. The definitions given by the emperor Justinian, of the law of nature, the law of nations, and the civil law, are well known. "The law of nature," says he, "is that which nature teaches to all animals": thus he defines the natural law in its most extensive sense, not that natural law which is peculiar to man, and which is derived as well from his rational as from his animal nature. "The civil law," that emperor adds, "is that which each nation has established for herself, and which peculiarly belongs to each state or civil society. And that law, which natural reason has established among all mankind, and which is equally observed by all people, is called the law of nations, as being law which all nations follow. In the succeeding paragraph, the emperor seems to approach nearer to the sense we at present give to that term. "The law of nations," says he, "is common to the whole human race. The exigencies and necessities of mankind have induced all nations to lay down and adopt certain rules of right. For wars have arisen, and produced captivity and servitude, which are contrary to the law of nature; since, by the law of nature, all men were originally born free." But from what he adds, — that almost all kinds of contracts, those of buying and selling, of hire, partnership, trust, and an infinite number of others, owe their origin to that law of nations,— it plainly appears to have been Justinian's idea, that, according to the situations and circumstances in which men were placed, right reason has dictated to them certain maxims of equity, so founded on the nature of things, that they have been universally acknowledged and adopted. Still this is nothing more than the law of nature, which is equally applicable to all mankind.
(K. Notes: The Constitution of the United States of America, and or, The Declaration, refer to The Laws of Nature and The Laws of Nations. This is why it is important to know the differences, if there are any real differences and to practice them, refine then, and live them.)
The Romans, however, acknowledged a law whose obligations are reciprocally binding on nations: and to that law they referred the right of embassies. They had also their fecial law, which was nothing more than the law of nations in its particular relation to public treaties, and especially to war. The feciales were the interpreters, the guardians, and, in a manner, the priests of the public faith. The moderns are generally agreed in restricting the appellation of "the law of nations" to that system of right and justice which ought to prevail between nations or sovereign states. They differ only in the ideas they entertain of the origin whence that system arose, and of the foundations upon which it rests. The celebrated Grotius understands it to be a system established by the common consent of nations: and he thus distinguishes it from the law of nature: "When several persons, at different times, and in various places, maintain the same thing as certain, such coincidence of sentiment must be attributed to some general cause. Now, in the questions before us, that cause must necessarily be one or the other of these two — either a just consequence drawn from natural principles, or a universal consent. The former discovers to us the law of nature, and the latter the law of nations."
That great man, as appears from many passages in his excellent work, had a glimpse of the truth: but as he had the task of extracting from the rude ore, as it were, and reducing into regular shape and form, a new and important subject, which had been much neglected before this time, it is not surprising that, having his mind burthened with an immense variety of objects, and with a numberless train of quotations, which formed a part of his plan, he could not always acquire those distinct ideas so necessary in the sciences. Persuaded that nations, or sovereign powers, are subject to the authority of the law of nature, the observance of which he so frequently recommends to them, that learned man, in fact, acknowledged a natural law of nations, which he somewhere calls the internal law of nations: and, perhaps it will appear that the only difference between him and us lies in the terms. But we have already observed, that, in order to form this natural law of nations, it is not sufficient simply to apply to nations what the law of nature decides with respect to individuals. And, besides, Grotius, by his very distinction, and by exclusively appropriating the name of "the law of nations" to those maxims which have been established by the common consent of mankind, seems to intimate that sovereigns, in their transactions with each other, cannot insist on the observance of any but those last-mentioned maxims, reserving the internal law for the direction of their own consciences. If, setting out with the idea that political societies or nations live, with respect to each other, in a reciprocal independence, in the state of nature, and that, as political bodies, they are subject to the natural law, Grotius had, moreover, considered that the law must be applied to these new subjects in a manner suitable to their nature, that judicious author would easily have discovered that the natural law of nations is a particular science; that it produces between nations even an external obligation wholly independent of their will; and that the common consent of mankind is only the foundation and source of a particular kind of law, called the Arbitrary Law of Nations.
(K. Notes: We note that the phrase “and that the common consent of mankind” appears in The Declaration when it refers to where governments get their just powers.)
Hobbes, in whose work we discover the hand of a master, notwithstanding his paradoxes and detestable maxims, — Hobbes was, I believe, the first who gave a distinct, though imperfect idea, of the law of nations. He divides the law of nature into that of man, and that of states: and the latter is, according to him, what we usually call the law of nations. "The maxims," he adds, "of each of these laws are precisely the same: but as states, once established, assume personal properties, that which is termed the natural law, when we speak of the duties of individuals is called the law of nations when applied to whole nations or states." This author has well observed, that the law of nations is the law of nature applied to states or nations. But we shall see, in the course of this work, that he was mistaken in the idea that the law of nature does not suffer any necessary change in that application, an idea, from which he concluded that the maxims of the law of nature and those of the law of nations are precisely the same.
Pufendorf declares that he unreservedly subscribes to this opinion espoused by Hobbes. He has not, therefore, separately treated of the law of nations, but has everywhere blended it with the law of nature, properly so called.
Barbeyrac, who performed the office of translator and commentator to Grotius and Pufendorf, has approached much nearer to the true idea of the law of nations. Though the work is in everybody's hands, I shall here, for the readers' convenience, transcribe one of that learned translator's notes on Grotius's Law of War and Peace. "I acknowledge," says he, "that there are laws common to all nations — things which all nations ought to practice towards each other: and if people choose to call these the law of nations, they may do so with great propriety. But, setting aside the consideration that the consent of mankind is not the basis of the obligation by which we are bound to observe those laws, and that it cannot even possibly take place in this instance — the principles and the rules of such a law are, in fact, the same as these of the law of nature, properly so called; the only difference consisting in the mode of their application, which may be somewhat varied, on account of the difference that sometimes happens in the manner in which nations settle their affairs with each other."
It did not escape the notice of the author we have just quoted, that the rules and decisions of the law of nature cannot be purely and simply applied to sovereign states, and that they must necessarily undergo some modifications in order to accommodate them to the nature of the new subjects to which they are applied. But it does not appear that he discovered the full extent of this idea, since he seems not to approve of the mode of treating the law of nations separately from the law of nature as relating to individuals. He only commends Budæus's method, saying, "It was right in that author to point out, after each article of the law of nature, the application which may be made of it to nations in their mutual relations to each other, so far, at least as his plan permitted or required that he should do this," Here Barbeyrac made one step, at least, in the right track: but it required more profound reflection, and more extensive views, in order to conceive the idea of a system of natural law of nations, which should claim the obedience of states and sovereigns, to perceive the utility of such a work, and especially to be the first to execute it.
(K. Notes: It is would hope that Vattel, when writing, “in order to conceive the idea of a system of natural law of nations, which should claim the obedience of states and sovereigns,” would mean that there is a Law to which the state [government] and sovereign must be bound. If this hope is true; The Declaration binds the Sovereign, where The Constitution binds the government - but only when successfully enforced.)
This glory was reserved for the Baron de Wolf. That great philosopher saw that the law of nature could not, with such modifications as the nature of the subjects required, and with sufficient precision, clearness, and solidity, be applied to incorporated nations, or states, without the assistance of those general principles and leading ideas by which the application is to be directed; that it is by those principles alone we are enabled evidently to demonstrate that the decisions of the law of nature, respecting individuals, must, pursuant to the intentions of that very law, be changed and modified in their application to states and political societies, and thus to form a natural and necessary law of nations: whence he concluded, that it was proper to form a distinct system of the law of nations, a task which he has happily executed. But it is just that we should hear what Wolf himself says in his Preface.
"Nations," says he, "do not, in their mutual relations to each other, acknowledge any other law than that which Nature herself has established. Perhaps, therefore, it may appear superfluous to give a treatise on the law of nations, as distinct from the law of nature. But those who entertain this idea have not sufficiently studied the subject. Nations, it is true, can only be considered as so many individual persons living together in the state of nature; and, for that reason, we must apply to them all the duties and rights which nature prescribes and attributes to men in general, as being naturally born free, and bound to each other by no ties but those of nature alone. The law which arises from this application, and the obligations resulting from it, proceed from that immutable law founded on the nature of man; and thus the law of nations certainly belongs to the law of nature: it is, therefore, on account of its origin, called the natural, and, by reason of its obligatory force, the necessary law of nations. That law is common to all nations; and if any one of them does not respect it in her actions, she violates the common rights of all the others.
"But nations or sovereign states being moral persons, and the subjects of the obligations and rights resulting, in virtue of the law of nature, from the act of association which has formed the political body, the nature and essence of these moral persons necessarily differ, in many respects, from the nature and essence of the physical individuals, or men, of whom they are composed. When, therefore, we would apply to nations the duties which the law of nature prescribes to individual man, and the rights it confers on him in order to enable him to fulfill his duties, since those rights and those duties can be no other than what are consistent with the nature of their subjects, they must, in their application, necessarily undergo a change suitable to the new subjects to which they are applied. Thus, we see that the law of nations does not, in every particular, remain the same as the law of nature, regulating the actions of individuals. Why may it not, therefore, be separately treated of, as a law peculiar to nations?"
Being myself convinced of the utility of such a work, I impatiently waited for Monsieur Wolf's production, and, as soon as it appeared, formed the design of facilitating, for the advantage of a greater number of readers, the knowledge of the luminous ideas which it contains. The treatise of the philosopher of Hall on the law of nations is dependent on all those of the same author on philosophy and the law of nature. In order to read and understand it, it is necessary to have previously studied sixteen or seventeen quarto volumes which precede it. Besides, it is written in the manner and even in the formal method of geometrical works. These circumstances present obstacles which render it nearly useless to those very persons in whom the knowledge and taste of the true principles of the law of nations are most important and most desirable. At first I thought that I should have had nothing farther to do than to detach this treatise from the entire system, by rendering it independent of every thing Monsieur Wolf had said before, and to give it a new form, more agreeable, and better calculated to insure it a reception in the polite world. With that view, I made some attempts; but I soon found, that if I indulged the expectation of procuring readers among that class of persons for whom I intended to write, and of rendering my efforts beneficial to mankind, it was necessary that I should form a very different work from that which lay before me, and undertake to furnish an original production. The method followed by Monsieur Wolf has had the effect of rendering his work dry, and in many respects incomplete. The different subjects are scattered through it in a manner that is extremely fatiguing to the attention; and, as the author had, in his "Law of Nature," treated of universal public law, he frequently contents himself with a bare reference to his former production, when, in handling the law of nations, he speaks of the duties of a nation towards herself.
From Monsieur Wolf's treatise, therefore, I have only borrowed whatever appeared most worth of attention, especially the definitions and general principles; but I have been careful in selecting what I drew from that source, and have accommodated to my own plan the materials with which he furnished me. Those who have read Monsieur Wolf's treatises on the law of nature and the law of nations, will see what advantage I have made of them. Had I everywhere pointed out what I have borrowed, my pages would be crowded with quotations equally useless and disagreeable to the reader. It is better to acknowledge here, once for all, the obligations I am under to that great master. Although my work be very different from his, (as will appear to those who are willing to take the trouble of making the comparison,) I confess that I should never have had the courage to launch into so extensive a field, if the celebrated philosopher of Hall had not preceded my steps, and held forth a torch to guide me on my way.
Sometimes, however, I have ventured to deviate from the path which he had pointed out, and adopted sentiments opposite to his.
I will here quote a few instances. Monsieur Wolf, influenced, perhaps, by the example of numerous other writers, has devoted several sections to the express purpose of treating of the nature of patrimonial kingdoms, without rejecting or rectifying that idea so degrading to human kind. I do not even admit of such a denomination, which I think equally shocking, improper, and dangerous, both in its effects, and in the impressions it may give to sovereigns: and in this, I flatter myself I shall obtain the suffrage of every man who possesses the smallest spark of reason and sentiment, in short, of every true citizen.
Monsieur Wolf determines (Jus Gent. § 878) that it is naturally lawful to make use of poisoned weapons in war. I am shocked at such a decision, and sorry to find it in the work of so great a man. Happily for the human race, it is not difficult to prove the contrary, even from Monsieur Wolf's own principles. What I have said on this subject may be seen in Book 3, § 156.
In the very outset of my work, it will be found that I differ entirely from Monsieur Wolf in the manner of establishing the foundations of that species of law of nations which we call voluntary. Monsieur Wolf deduces it from the idea of a great republic (civitatis maximæ) instituted by nature herself, and of which all nations of the world are members. According to him, the voluntary law of nations is, as it were, the civil law of that great republic. This idea does not satisfy me; nor do I think the fiction of such a republic either admissible in itself, or capable of affording sufficiently solid grounds on which to build the rules of the universal law of nations, which shall necessarily claim the obedient acquiescence of sovereign states. I acknowledge no other natural society between nations than that which nature has established between mankind in general. It is essential to every civil society (civitati) that each member have resigned a part of his right to the body of the society, and that there exist in it an authority capable of commanding all the members, of giving them laws, and of compelling those who should refuse to obey. Nothing of this kind can be conceived or supposed to subsist between nations. Each sovereign state claims, and actually possesses an absolute independence on all the others. They are all, according to Monsieur Wolf himself, to be considered as so many individuals who live together in the state of nature, and who acknowledge no other laws but those of nature, or of her Great Author. Now, although nature has indeed established a general society between mankind, by creating them subject to such wants as rendering assistance of their fellow creatures indispensably necessary to enable them to live in a manner suitable to men, yet she has not imposed on them any particular obligation to unite in civil society, properly so called: and if they all obeyed the injunctions of that good parent, their subjection to the restraints of civil society would be unnecessary. It is true, that as there does not exist in mankind a disposition voluntarily to observe towards each other the rules of the law of nature, they have had recourse to a political association, as the only adequate remedy against the depravity of the majority the only means of securing the condition of the good, and repressing the wicked: and the law of nature itself approves of this establishment. But it is easy to perceive that the civic association is very far from being equally necessary between nations, as it was between individuals. We cannot, therefore, say, that nature equally recommends it, much less that she has prescribed it. Individuals are so constituted, and are capable of doing so little by themselves, that they can scarcely subsist without the aid and the laws of civil society. But, as soon as a considerable number of them have united under this same government, they become able to supply most of their wants; and the assistance of other political societies is not so necessary to them as that of individuals is to an individual. These societies have still, it is true, powerful motives for carrying on a communication and commerce with each other; and it is even their duty to do it; since no man can, without good reasons, refuse assistance to another man. But the law of nature may suffice to regulate this commerce, and this correspondence. States conduct themselves in a different manner from individuals. It is not usually the caprice or blind impetuosity of a single person that forms the resolutions and determines the measures of the public: they are carried on with more deliberation and circumspection; and, on difficult or important occasions, arrangements are made and regulations established by means of treaties. To this we may add, that independence is even necessary to each state, in order to enable her properly to discharge the duties she owes to herself and to her citizens, and to govern herself in the manner best suited to her circumstances. It is, therefore, sufficient (as I have already said) that nations should conform to what is required of them by the natural and general society established between all mankind.
(K. Notes: This statement,”It is essential to every civil society [civitati] that each member have resigned a part of his right to the body of the society, and that there exist in it an authority capable of commanding all the members, of giving them laws, and of compelling those who should refuse to obey.” This near-perfectly details the relationship between The Declaration and The Constitution with respect to how our society, our nation and its government are supposed to function together.)
But, says Monsieur Wolf, a rigid adherence to the law of nature cannot always prevail in that commerce and society of nations; it must undergo various modifications, which can only be deduced from this idea of a kind of great republic of nations, whose laws, dictated by sound reason, and founded on necessity, shall regulate the alterations to be made in the natural and necessary law of nations, as the civil laws of a particular state determine what modifications shall take place in the natural law of individuals. I do not perceive the necessity of this consequence; and I flatter myself that I shall, in the course of this work, be able to prove, that all the modifications, all the restrictions, — in a word, all the alterations which the rigor of the natural law must be made to undergo in the affairs of nations, and from which the voluntary law of nations is formed, — to prove, I say, that all these alterations are deducible from the natural liberty of nations, from the attention due to their common safely, from the nature of their mutual correspondence, their reciprocal duties, and the distinctions of their various rights, internal and external, perfect and imperfect, — by a mode of reasoning nearly similar to that which Monsieur Wolf has pursued, with respect to individuals, in his treatise on the law of nature.
In that treatise it is made to appear that the rules which, in consequence of the natural liberty of mankind, must be admitted in questions of external right, do not cancel the obligation which the internal right imposes on the conscience of each individual. It is easy to apply this doctrine to nations, and, by carefully drawing the line of distinction between the internal and external right — between the necessary and the voluntary law of nations — to teach them not to indulge themselves in the commission of every act which they may do with impunity, unless it be approved by the immutable laws of justice and the voice of conscience.
Since nations, in their transactions with each other, are equally bound to admit those exceptions to, and those modifications of, the rigor of the necessary law, whether they be deduced from the idea of a great republic of which all nations are supposed to be the members, or derived from the source from whence I propose to draw them, — there can be no reason why the system which thence results should not be called the Voluntary Law of nations, in contradistinction to the necessary, internal, and consciential law. Names are of very little consequence: but it is of considerable importance carefully to distinguish these two kinds of law, in order that we may never confound what is just and good in itself, with what is only tolerated through necessity.
The necessary and the voluntary laws of nations are therefore both established by nature, but each in a different manner: the former, as a sacred law which nations and sovereigns are bound to respect and follow in all their actions; the latter, as a rule which the general welfare and safety oblige them to admit in their transactions with each other. The necessary law immediately proceeds from nature; and that common mother of mankind recommends the observance of the voluntary law of nations, in consideration of the state in which nations stand with respect to each other, and for the advantage of their affairs. This double law, founded on certain and invariable principles, is susceptible of demonstration, and will constitute the principal subject of this work.
There is another kind of law of nations, which authors call arbitrary, because it proceeds from the will or consent of nations. States, as well as individuals, may acquire rights and contract obligations, by express engagements, by compact and treaties; hence results a conventional law of nations, peculiar to the contracting powers. Nations may also bind themselves by their tacit consent: upon this ground rest all those regulations which custom has introduced between different states, and which constitute the wage of nations, or the law of nations founded on custom. It is evident that this law cannot impose any obligation except on those particular nations who have, by long use, given their sanction to its maxims: it is a peculiar law, and limited in its operations, as the conventional law; both the one and the other derive all their obligatory force from that maxim of the natural law which makes it the duty of nations to fulfill their engagements, whether express or tacit. The same maxim ought to regulate the conduct of states with regard to the treaties they conclude and the customs they adopt. I must content myself with simply laying down the general rules and principles which the law of nature furnishes for the direction of sovereigns in this respect. A particular detail of the various treaties and customs of different states belongs to history, and not to a systematic treatise on the law of nations.
(K. Notes: This statement, “There is another kind of law of nations, which authors call arbitrary, because it proceeds from the will or consent of nations. States, as well as individuals, may acquire rights and contract obligations, by express engagements, by compact and treaties; hence results a conventional law of nations, peculiar to the contracting powers.” This is The Declaration. It is a compact, a law between and among all united States Americans.)
Such a treatise ought, as we have already observed, principally to consist in a judicious and rational application of the principles of the law of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations and sovereigns. The study of the law of nations supposes therefore a previous knowledge of the ordinary law of nature; and, in fact, I proceed on the supposition that my readers are already, to a certain degree at least, possessed of that knowledge. Nevertheless, as it is not agreeable to readers in general to be obliged to recur to other authorities for proofs of what an author advances, I have taken care to establish, in a few words, the most important of those principles of the law of nature which I intend to apply to nations. But I have not always thought it necessary to trace them to their primary foundations for the purpose of demonstration, but have sometimes contented myself with supporting them by common truths which are acknowledged by every candid reader, without carrying the analysis any farther. It is sufficient for me to persuade, and for this purpose to advance nothing as a principle that will not readily be admitted by every sensible man.
The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them, and for their ministers, that it ought to be written. All mankind are indeed interested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is a proper employment for every citizen; but it would be of little consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individuals, who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no influence in directing the public measures. If the conductors of states, if all those who are employed in public affairs, condescended to apply seriously to the study of a science which ought to be their law, and, as it were, the compass by which to steer their course, what happy effects might we not expect from a good treatise on the law of nations! We every day feel the advantages of a good body of laws in civil society: — the law of nations is, in point of importance, as much superior to the civil law, as the proceedings of nations and sovereigns are more momentous in their consequences than those of private persons.
(K. Notes: This statement, “The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them, and for their ministers, that it ought to be written. All mankind are indeed interested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is a proper employment for every citizen; but it would be of little consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individuals, who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no influence in directing the public measures” details The Declarations as a law among sovereigns, and The Constitution as the law by the sovereigns to guide their ministers in government.)
But fatal experience too plainly proves how little regard those who are at the head of affairs pay to the dictates of justice, in conjunctures where they hope to find their advantage. Satisfied with bestowing their attention on a system of politics which is often false, since often unjust, the generality of them think they have done enough when they have thoroughly studied that. Nevertheless, we may truly apply to states a maxim which has long been acknowledged as true with respect to individuals, — that the best and safest policy is that which is founded on virtue. Cicero, as a great master in the art of government as in eloquence and philosophy, does not content himself with rejecting the vulgar maxim, that "a state cannot be happily governed without committing injustice;" he even proceeds so far as to lay down the very reverse of the proposition as an invariable truth, and maintains, that "without a strict attention to the most rigid justice, public affairs cannot be advantageously administered."
Providence occasionally bestows on the world kings and ministers whose minds are impressed with this great truth. Let us not renounce the pleasing hope that the number of those wise conductors of nations will one day be multiplied; and in the interim let us, each in his own sphere, exert our best efforts to accelerate the happy period.
It is principally with a view of rendering my work palatable to those by whom it is of the most importance that it should be read and relished, that I have sometimes joined examples to the maxims I advance: and in that idea I have been confirmed by the approbation of one of those ministers who are the enlightened friends of the human race, and who alone ought to be admitted into the councils of kings. But I have been sparing in the use of such embellishments. Without ever aiming at a vain parade of erudition, I only sought to afford an occasional relaxation to the reader's mind, or to render the doctrine more impressive by an example, and sometimes to show that the practice of nations is conformable to the principles laid down: and, whenever I found a convenient opportunity, I have, above all things, endeavored to inspire a love of virtue, by showing, from striking passage of history, how amiable it is, how worthy of our homage in some truly great men, and even productive of solid advantage. I have quoted the chief part of my examples from modern history, as well because these are more interesting, as to avoid a repetition of those which have been already accumulated by Grotius, Pufendorf, and their commentators.
As to the rest, I have, both in these examples and in my reasonings studiously endeavored to avoid giving offense; it being my intention religiously to observe the respect due to nations and sovereign powers: but I have made it a still more sacred rule to respect the truth, and the interests of the human race. If among the base flatterers of despotic power, my principles meet with opponents, I shall have on my side the virtuous man, the friend of the laws, the man of probity, and the true citizen.
I should prefer the alternative of total silence, were I not at liberty in my writings to obey the dictates of my conscience. By my pen lies under no restraint, and I am incapable of prostituting it to flattery. I was born in a country of which liberty is the soul, the treasure, and the fundamental law; and my birth qualifies me to be the friend of all nations. These favorable circumstances have encouraged me in the attempt to render myself useful to mankind by this work. I felt conscious of my deficiency in knowledge and abilities: I saw that I was undertaking an arduous task; but I shall rest satisfied if that class of readers whose opinions are entitled to respect, discover in my labors the traces of the honest man and the good citizen.
(K. Notes: This phrase, “readers whose opinions are entitled to respect”, though worded differently, is common in The Declaration, which states "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.")
Preliminaries: Idea and General Principles of the Law of Nations
§ 1. What is meant by a nation or state.
NATIONS or states are bodies politic, societies of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safely and advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength.
(K. Notes: This idea shows in The Declaration with these words. First: their mutual advantage; "-That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [security of the peoples' rights], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Then: the joint efforts of their combined strength, The Declaration ends with this pledge: "And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.")
§ 2. It is a moral person.
Such a society has her affairs and her interests; she deliberates and takes resolutions in common; thus becoming a moral person, who possesses an understanding and a will peculiar to herself, and is susceptible of obligations and rights.
(K. Notes: We see this concept at the end of the second to last paragraph of The Declaration, "We [the people of the united States] must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them [the people of Great Britain], as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends."
The statement is made as though the people of each respective body [the united States, and those of Great Britain] two distinct moral persons and the rest of mankind is a distinct third moral person.)
§ 3. Definition of the law of nations.
To establish on a solid foundation the obligations and rights of nations, is the design of this work. The Law of Nations is the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights.
(K. Notes: In these united States of America, many a citizens can tell you what rights they possess, but are short on being as able to speak of the rights that other people possess. This demonstrates a lack of obligations that come with each right.
As an example; the right of freedom of speech is often cited by an individual who is yelling or cranking the volume of a loud speaker to its maximum during any hour of the day or night. Yet these people ignore the obligations to respect the other people who would rather not have to fight the noise while they try to sleep or focus on other tasks.
Yes. The person does have the right to speak; but they have the obligation to keep the volume to only the point that their immediate audience [being those people who gathered in close to listen] can hear. It is not their right to boost the volume so that every living being within the sound of the excess volume might hear, though some city-blocks away.)
(K. Notes: This phrase, about what are rights, is a good start. “For, the right being nothing more than the power of doing what is morally possible, that is to say, what is proper and consistent with duty — it is evident that right is derived from duty, or passive obligation”
A right – is an action.; a doing. Not just any doing; but moral actions that are consistent with ones duty. But who is to dictate to another, what is a moral possibility?
It is the phrase "what is proper and consistent with duty — it is evident that right is derived from duty, or passive obligation" that connects the action to the duty that makes the action moral.
If you possess some thing that I desire; my desire does not make it moral for me to remove it from your possession, without your consent. However, if you are using that item to harm myself or my property; it becomes my duty to remove it from your possession in order to stop the harm, especially when circumstances do not allow bringing the case before a jury. When contest arises because of the taking; it is necessary that both parties detail their actions before an impartial body to determine which action was necessary, as it pertains to keeping the social order.)
§ 4. In what light nations or states are to be considered.
Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature, — Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature. It is a settled point with writers on the natural law, that all men inherit from nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot be deprived without their own consent. In a State, the individual citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. But the body of the nation, the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.
(K. Notes: In this paragraph we see two seemingly conflicting thoughts. The one thought is that the individuals are not to be deprived of any of their liberty or independence, without first having agreed to that limitation.
The other thought is that individuals partially surrender these to the sovereign, but does not identify that sovereign entity.
If these thoughts are not in conflict, we must recognize that The Sovereign is the collective body of citizens. For the Sovereign to act, it must do so as a unified body where, at the very least, a simple majority (at least one more than 50% of the total number) is required. Without that majority, the body is not morally able to act, by granting to its government certain powers to regulate the rights, lives, and property of the general society.
Without a formal contract among all members of that society that binds all members concerning what powers the majority may of right grant to government; a simple majority of 50% of the total + 1 can unjustly take from others who have done no wrongs and have harmed no others or their property.
This is where The Declaration solves this unjust taking by society against honorable individuals. The Declaration states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"...
With that statement, the only powers that the majority may of right grant to government are only those powers requires to equally secure every person's rights; as every person possesses the exact same list of rights, each individual will select different rights or actions to exercise. Of those who select some of the same rights from the list, each may place different value levels as to how far they are willing to go to defend that right.
NO government or any of its officers can rightly be considered the sovereign; though they are supposed to act under the direction of The Sovereign, which is the governed body, acting in the majority and in accord with the terms of their social contract [hopefully a written contract].)
§ 5. To what laws nations are subject.
As men are subject to the laws of nature, — and as their union in civil society cannot have exempted them from the obligation to observe those laws, since by that union they do not cease to be men, — the entire nation, whose common will is but the result of the united wills of the citizens, remains subject to the laws of nature, and is bound to respect them in all her proceedings. And since right arises from obligation, as we have just observed (§3), the nation possesses also the same rights which nature has conferred upon men in order to enable them to perform their duties.
(K. Notes: This is important to keep fixed firmly in mind; “ — the entire nation, whose common will is but the result of the united wills of the citizens, remains subject to the laws of nature”.
Be careful about this last half of the paragraph: "And since right arises from obligation, as we have just observed (§3), the nation possesses also the same rights which nature has conferred upon men in order to enable them to perform their duties." It is this last part that indicates that simply because any individual may of right take a certain action in a given situation, that the government may of right do so without first seeking the authority of the society.
This is where the written Declaration of the united States clarifies this issue. It states: "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed". With that statement, the government must first get the governed people to consent or grant that power to the government or to a specific government officer.)
§ 6. In what the law of nations originally consists.
We must therefore apply to nations the rules of the law of nature, in order to discover what their obligations are, and what their rights: consequently, the law of Nations is originally no other than the law of Nature applied to Nations. But as the application of a rule cannot be just and reasonable unless it be made in a manner suitable to the subject, we are not to imagine that the law of nations is precisely and in every case the same as the law of nature, with the difference only of the subjects to which it is applied, so as to allow of our substituting nations for individuals. A state or civil society is a subject very different from an individual of the human race; from which circumstance, pursuant to the law of nature itself, there result, in many cases, very different obligations and rights: since the same general rule, applied to two subjects, cannot produce exactly the same decisions, when the subjects are different; and a particular rule which is perfectly just with respect to one subject, is not applicable to another subject of a quite different nature. There are many cases, therefore, in which the law of Nature does not decide between state and state in the same manner as it would between man and man. We must therefore know how to accommodate the application of it to different subjects; and it is the art of thus applying it with a precision founded on right reason, that renders the law of Nations a distinct science.
§ 7. Definition of the necessary law of nations.
We call that the Necessary Law of Nations which consists in the application of the law of nature to Nations. It is Necessary because nations are absolutely bound to observe it. This law contains the precepts prescribed by the law of nature to states, on whom that law is not less obligatory than on individuals, since states are composed of men, their resolutions are taken by men, and the law of nature is binding on all men, under whatever relation they act. This is the law which Grotius, and those who follow him, call the Internal law of Nations, on account of its being obligatory on nations in point of conscience. Several writers term it the Natural law of Nations.
§ 8. It is immutable.
Since therefore the necessary law of nations consists in the application of the law of nature to states, — which law is immutable, as being founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man, — it follows that the Necessary law of nations is immutable.
§ 9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the obligations arising from it.
Whence, as this law is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.
(K. Notes: If the nation, which is the body of people, cannot release each other from The Laws of Nature: Why then do government officers, who get their power from the governed people act as though they can release themselves and those they choose from the Laws of Nature by acting contrary to the Constitutions that the people created to control the same government officers?)This is the principle by which we may distinguish lawful conventions or treaties from those that are not lawful, and innocent and rational customs from those that are unjust or censurable. There are things, just in themselves, and allowed by the necessary law of nations, on which states may mutually agree with each other, and which they may consecrate and enforce by their manners and customs. There are others of an indifferent nature, respecting which, it rests at the option of nations to make in their treaties whatever agreements they please, or to introduce whatever custom or practice they think proper. But every treaty, every custom, which contravenes the injunctions or prohibitions of the Necessary law of nations is unlawful. It will appear, however, in the sequel that it is only by the Internal law, by the law of Conscience, such conventions or treaties are always condemned as unlawful, and that, for reasons which shall be given in their proper place, they are nevertheless often valid by the external law. Nations being free and independent, though the conduct of one of them be illegal and condemnable by the laws of conscience, the others are bound to acquiesce in it, when it does not infringe upon their perfect rights. The liberty of that nation would not remain entire, if the others were to arrogate to themselves the right of inspecting and regulating her actions; an assumption on their part, that would be contrary to the law of nature, which declares every nation free and independent of all the others.
(K. Notes: "Nations being free and independent, though the conduct of one of them be illegal and condemnable by the laws of conscience, the others are bound to acquiesce in it, when it does not infringe upon their perfect rights. The liberty of that nation would not remain entire, if the others were to arrogate to themselves the right of inspecting and regulating her actions; an assumption on their part, that would be contrary to the law of nature, which declares every nation free and independent of all the others."
Yet, that is exactly the actions taken by the United Nations; the world police; involving themselves in the domestic affairs of nations considered to be less than desirable." This is also resolved in The Declaration's statement, "and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends."
The Declaration's statement literally makes it off limits to our government, any powers that might interfere with the lives of those in other nations; so long as those other governments are not unjustly violating the rights of our own people. This action may seem unethical; but we must remember that the people of any country possess the right to suffer under any government that have not or refuse to unify in order to correct it.)
§ 10. Society established by nature between all mankind.
Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is sufficiently proved by experience. We have instances of persons, who, having grown up to manhood among the bears of the forest, enjoyed not the use of speech or of reason, but were, like the brute beasts, possessed only of sensitive faculties. We see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength and natural weapons of defense with which she has furnished other animals — having, in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge; and having thus become intelligent, they find a thousand methods of preserving themselves, and supplying their wants. Each individual, moreover, is intimately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his nature without the intercourse and assistance of others. Since, therefore, nature has thus formed mankind, it is a convincing proof of her intention that they should communicate with, and mutually aid and assist each other.
(K. Notes: This statement, " endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge;" indicates that the others beasts on the planet cannot or do not talk with each other – simply because we do not properly comprehend their language or forms of communications — yet.)Hence is deduced the establishment of natural society among men. The general law of that society is, that each individual should do for the others every thing which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to himself: a law which all men must observe in order to live in a manner consonant to their nature, and conformable to the views of their common Creator — a law which our own safety, our happiness, our dearest interests, ought to render sacred to every one of us. Such is the general obligation that binds us to the observance of our duties: let us fulfill them with care, if we would wisely endeavor to promote our own advantage.
(K. Notes: This, "The general law of that society is, that each individual should do for the others every thing which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to himself:" tends to indicate that if I have two cars and you have none, but seem to need on; I should give to you one of the cars I possess. After all, I can only drive one at a time.)It is easy to conceive what exalted felicity the world would enjoy, were all men willing to observe the rule that we have just laid down. On the contrary, if each man wholly and immediately directs all his thoughts to his own interest, if he does nothing for the sake of other men, the whole human race together will be immersed in the deepest wretchedness. Let us therefore endeavor to promote the general happiness of mankind; all mankind, in return, will endeavor to promote ours, and thus we shall establish our felicity on the most solid foundations.
(K. Notes: Though a feel-good idea; it seldom does the other person good to provide to them some "need" that they have not yet earned. In fact, it weakens them into a continued dependency. We see this throughout nature and humans. Helping the bird or butterfly free themselves from their entrapment weakens them to the point of quickly dying for inability to fend for themselves.)
§ 11. And between all nations.
The universal society of the human race being an institution of nature herself, that is to say, a necessary consequence of the nature of man, — all men, in whatever stations they are placed, are bound to cultivate it, and to discharge its duties. They cannot liberate themselves from the obligation by any convention, by any private association. When, therefore, the unit in civil society for the purpose of forming a separate state or nation, they may indeed enter into particular engagements towards those with whom they associate themselves; but they remain still bound to the performance of their duties towards the rest of mankind. All the difference consists in this, that having agreed to act in common, and having resigned their rights and submitted their will to the body of the society, in every thing that concerns their common welfare, it thenceforward belongs to that body, that state, and its rulers, to fulfill the duties of humanity towards strangers, in every thing that no longer depends on the liberty of individuals; and it is the state more particularly that is to perform those duties towards other states. We have already seen, (§ 5), that men united in society remain subject to the obligations imposed upon them by human nature. That society, considered as a moral person, since possessed of an understanding, volition, and strength peculiar to itself, is therefore obliged to live on the same terms with other societies or states, as individual man was obliged, before those establishments, to live with other men, that is to say, according to the laws of the natural society established among the human race, with the difference only of such exceptions as may arise from the different nature of the subjects.
§ 12. The object of this society of nations.
Since the object of the natural society established between all mankind is — that they should lend each other mutual assistance, in order to attain perfection themselves, and to render their condition as perfect as possible, — and since nations, considered as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are bound to cultivate human society with each other, — the object of the great society established by nature between all nations is also the interchange of mutual assistance for their own improvement, and that of their condition.
§ 13. General obligation imposed by it.
The first general law that we discover in the very object of the society of nations, is that each individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others.
(K. Notes: This supposed law is not seen much in nature; nor should it be so expected. "[E]ach individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others" would be to say; in accord with Vattel, that every individual person within a nation is supposed to contribute every thing in their power to the happiness and perfections of all others within that nation.
In so doing, the entire nation will become miserable. If you are to contribute every thing in your power to make me happy; you do have it in your power to give to me every thing that you possess, so that I might be happy.
But then... what about your happiness?
You can quickly see the problem developing.
This law, if you will; would be that every individual, if so inclined to help another, with the excess of their own resources, may do so until they decide otherwise.
The person who claims such a need, or even appears to truly be in need, should not expect any or everyone to contribute to his happiness. An individual's happiness can only be satisfied by that individuals own pursuits and not by the pursuits of others.)
§ 14. Explanation of this observation.
But the duties that we owe to ourselves being unquestionably paramount to those we owe to others, — a nation owes herself in the first instance, and in preference to all other nations, to do every thing she can to promote her own happiness and perfection. (I say every thing she can, not only in a physical but in a moral sense, — that is, every thing that she can do lawfully, and consistently with justice and honor.) When, therefore, she cannot contribute to the welfare of another nation without doing an essential injury to herself, her obligation ceases on that particular occasion, and she is considered as lying under a disability to perform the office in question.
(K. Notes: It might have been better for Vattel to combine sections §13 & §14, thus stating §14 first, as it is a condition against §13.)
§ 15. The second general law is the liberty and independence of nations.
Nations being free and independent of each other, in the same manner as men are naturally free and independent, the second general law of their society is, that each nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature. The natural society of nations cannot subsist, unless the natural rights of each be duly respected. No nation is willing to renounce her liberty; she will rather break off all commerce with those stales that should attempt to infringe upon it.
(K. Notes: This is a curious statement, and slightly incorrect. "the second general law of their society is, that each nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature".
Society does not inherit its enjoyment of liberty from nature; the individual enjoys that inheritance. The society attains or enjoys certain specific liberties or powers that the majority may of right grant to the society [city, county, state, nation] to exercise on behalf of the individuals.)
§ 16. Effect of that liberty.
As a consequence of that liberty and independence, it exclusively belongs to each nation to form her own judgment of what her conscience prescribes to her, — of what she can or cannot do, — of what it is proper or improper for her to do: and of course it rests solely with her to examine and determine whether she can perform any office for another nation without neglecting the duty which she owes to herself. In all cases, therefore, in which a nation has the right of judging what her duty requires, no other nation can compel her to act in such or such particular manner: for any attempt at such compulsion would be an infringement on the liberty of nations. We have no right to use constraint against a free person, except in those cases where such person is bound to perform some particular thing for us, and for some particular reason which does not depend on his judgment, — in those cases, in short, where we have a perfect right against him.
(K. Notes: It must be clear that the nation [the government created to act on behalf of the citizens] has absolutely no authority to do as it "things proper" without first obtaining the lawful authority from the citizens to act in that manner; either towards its own people or towards other nations.)
§ 17. Distinctions between internal and external, perfect and imperfect obligations and rights.
In order perfectly to understand this, it is necessary to observe, that the obligation, and the right which corresponds to or is derived from it, are distinguished into external and internal. The obligation is internal, as it binds the conscience, and is deduced from the rules of our duty: it is external, as it is considered relatively to other men, and produces some right between them. The internal obligation is always the same in its nature, though it varies in degree; but the external obligation is divided into perfect and imperfect; and the right that results from it is also perfect or imperfect. The perfect right is that which is accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfill the correspondent obligation; the imperfect right is unaccompanied by that right of compulsion. The perfect obligation is that which gives to the opposite party the right of compulsion; the imperfect gives him only a right to ask.
(K. Notes: When it comes to government, especially concerning these uniterd States of America; The perfect right of government only comes when the governed people have granted to the government specific powers, via the majority of the total body of registered voters — BUT only so long as those powers work towards the equal security of every person's rights.
This would be in accord with The Declaration's statement, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.")
It is now easy to conceive why the right is always imperfect, when the correspondent obligation depends on the judgment of the party in whose breast it exists; for if, in such a case, we had a right to compel him, he would no longer enjoy the freedom of determination respecting the conduct he is to pursue in order to obey the dictates of his own conscience. Our obligation is always imperfect with respect to other people, while we possess the liberty of judging how we are to act: and we retain that liberty on all occasions where we ought to be free.
§ 18. Equality of nations.
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and obligations, as equally proceeding from nature — Nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.
(K. Notes: Since Vattel is intent on driving this point again: "Nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights." The counter point must also be driven. Nations, being the collective body of people, acting as a single body [hence as a government] do not automatically "inherit" the same rights or level of perfection of those rights that the individuals may otherwise possess when acting as individuals.
The nation, especially these united States of America, can only honorably act in accord with the terms of The Constitution — but only when those terms do not violate the terms within The Declaration concerning the grant of such powers.)
§ 19. Effect of that equality.
By a necessary consequence of that equality, whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other.
(K. Notes: This would generally be true of the external exercise; but not for the internal exercise.
The people of one nation may determine that the equal protection of their rights may be done by granting this power; while the people of another nation may think proper to grant a quite different power.)
§ 20. Each nation is mistress of her own actions, when they do not affect the perfect rights of others.
A nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they do not affect the proper and perfect rights of any other nation — so long as she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any external and perfect obligation. If she makes an ill use of her liberty, she is guilty of a breach of duty; but other nations are bound to acquiesce in her conduct, since they have no right to dictate to her.
(K. Notes: See §19 K. Note.)
§ 21. Foundation of the voluntary law of nations.
Since nations are free, independent, and equal — and since each possesses the right of judging, according to the dictates of her conscience, what conduct she is to pursue in order to fulfill her duties the effect of the whole is, to produce, at least externally and in the eyes of mankind, a perfect equality of rights between nations in the administration of their affairs and the pursuit of their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive judgment; so that whatever may be done by any one nation may be done by any other; and they ought, in human society, to be considered as possessing equal rights.
(K. Notes: This concept, "Since nations are free, independent, and equal — and since each possesses the right of judging, according to the dictates of her conscience" appears in The Declaration as, "and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.")Each nation in fact maintains that she has justice on her side in every dispute that happens to arise; and it does not belong to either of the parties interested, or to other nations, to pronounce a judgment on the contested question. The party who is in the wrong is guilty of a crime against her own conscience; but as there exists a possibility that she may perhaps have justice on her side, we cannot accuse her of violating the laws of society.
(K. Notes: Regarding this thought, "Each nation in fact maintains that she has justice on her side in every dispute that happens to arise;" Nation, being government, specific to these united States of America cannot claim such a position, unless The Constitution specifically grants to government such power in that regard.)It is therefore necessary, on many occasions, that nations should suffer certain things to be done, though in their own nature unjust and condemnable, because they cannot oppose them by open force, without violating the liberty of some particular state, and destroying the foundations of their natural society. And since they are bound to cultivate that society, it is of course presumed that all nations have consented to the principle we have just established. The rules that are deduced from it constitute what Monsieur Wolf calls "The voluntary law of nations"; and there is no reason why we should not use the same term, although we thought it necessary to deviate from that great man in our manner of establishing the foundation of that law.
§ 22. Right of nations against the infractors of the law of nations.
The laws of natural society are of such importance to the safety of all states, that, if the custom once prevailed of trampling them under foot, no nation could flatter herself with the hope of preserving her national existence, and enjoying domestic tranquility, however attentive to pursue every measure dictated by the most consummate prudence, justice, and moderation. Not all men and all states have a perfect right to those things that are necessary for their preservation, since that right corresponds to an indispensable obligation. All nations have therefore a right to resort to forcible means for the purpose of repressing any one particular nation who openly violates the laws of the society which Nature has established between them, or who directly attacks the welfare and safety of that society.
(K. Notes: This clause, "the welfare and safety of that society" is seen in The Declaration as, "most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness"; and in The Constitution's Preamble as, "provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare". None of which speaks to the individual welfare, safety, happiness, or defense.
However, it the welfare, safety, happiness, or defense of society, in general, is well maintained, the individual standing in those respects is far better than if the condition of the general society was in total disrepair.)
§ 23. Measure of that right.
But care must be taken not to extend that right to the prejudice of the liberty of nations. They are all free and independent, but bound to observe the laws of that society which Nature has established between them; and so far bound, that, when any of them violates those laws, the others have a right to repress her. The conduct of each nation, therefore, is no further subject to the control of the others, than as the interests of natural society are concerned. The general and common right of nations over the conduct of any sovereign state is only commensurate to the object of that society which exists between them.
(K. Notes: The phrase, "and so far bound, that, when any of them violates those laws, the others have a right to repress her" might better explain why these united States got involved in the Hitler World War than any other explanation. As Hitler advanced his conquering into other nations against their will, it became an urgent matter for those nations not yet involved to com to the aid of those presently under his attack.
However, had Hitler restrained his assaults to within his own nation; foreign nations would have less right to step in to stop him. The exception to this, would be similar to that of the newly formed united States of America in 1776. Once formed into a separate and independent body; organized to have leaders negotiate and contract on behalf of the society citizens --then, that newly formed nation may of right request the aid of other nations to help her defend her people.)
§ 24. Conventional law of nations, or law of treaties.
The several engagements into which nations may enter produce a new kind of law of nations, called Conventional, or of Treaties. As it is evident that a treaty binds none but the contracting parties, the conventional law of nations is not a universal but a particular law. All that can be done on this subject, in a treatise on the Law of Nations, is to lay down those general rules which nations are bound to observe with respect to their treaties. A minute detail of the various agreements made between particular nations, and of the rights and obligations thence resulting, is matter of fact, and belongs to the province of history.
§ 25. Customary law of nations.
Certain maxims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law, form the Customary Law of Nations, or the Custom of Nations. This law is founded on a tacit consent, or, if you please, on a tacit convention of the nations, that observe it towards each other. Whence it appears that it is not obligatory except on those nations who have adopted it, and that it is not universal, any more than the conventional law. The same remark, therefore, is equally applicable to this customary law, viz. that a minute detail of its particulars does not belong to a systematic treatise on the law of nations, but that we must content ourselves with giving a general theory of it; that is to say, the rules which are to be observed in it, as well with a view to its effects, as to its substance; and with respect to the latter, those rules will serve to distinguish lawful and innocent customs from those that are unjust and unlawful.
§ 26. General rule respecting that law.
When a custom or usage is generally established, either between all the civilized nations in the world, or only between those of a certain continent, as of Europe, for example, or between those who have a more frequent intercourse with each other; if that custom is in its own nature indifferent, and much more, if it be useful and reasonable, it becomes obligatory on all the nations in question, who are considered as having given their consent to it, and are bound to observe it towards each other, as long as they have not expressly declared their resolution of not observing it in future. But if that custom contains any thing unjust or unlawful, it is not obligatory; on the contrary, every nation is bound to relinquish it, since nothing can oblige or authorize her to violate the law of nature.
§ 27. Positive law of nations.
These three kinds of law of nations, the Voluntary, the Conventional, and the Customary, together constitute the Positive Law of Nations. For they all proceed from the will of Nations; the Voluntary from their presumed consent, the Conventional from an express consent, and the Customary from tacit consent; and as there can be no other mode of deducing any law from the will of nations, there are only these three kinds of positive law of nations. We shall be careful to distinguish them from the Natural or Necessary law of nations, without, however, treating of them separately. But after having, under each individual head of our subject, established what the Necessary law prescribes, we shall immediately add how and why the decisions of that law must be modified by the Voluntary law; or (which amounts to the same thing in other terms) we shall explain how, in consequence of the liberty of nations, and pursuant to the rules of their natural society, the external law which they are to observe towards each other differs in certain instances from the maxims of the internal law, which nevertheless remains always obligatory in point of conscience. As to the rights introduced by Treaties or by Custom, there is no room to apprehend that any one will confound them with the Natural law of nations. They form that species of law of nations which authors have distinguished by the name of Arbitrary.
§ 28. General maxim respecting the use of the necessary and the voluntary law.
To furnish the reader beforehand with a general direction respecting the distinction between the Necessary and the Voluntary law, let us here observe, that, as the Necessary law is always obligatory on the conscience, a nation ought never to lose sight of it in deliberating on the line of conduct she is to pursue in order to fulfill her duty; but when there is question of examining what she may demand of other states, she must consult the Voluntary law, whose maxims are devoted to the safety and advantage of the universal society of mankind.
BOOK 1: Of Nations Considered in Themselves
CHAPTER 1: Of Nations or Sovereign States
§ 1. Of the state, and of sovereignty
A NATION or a state is, as has been said at the beginning of this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined strength. From the very design that induces a number of men to form a society which has its common interests, and which is to act in concert, it is necessary that there should be established a Public Authority, to order and direct what is to be done by each in relation to the end of the association. This political authority is the Sovereignty; and he or they who are invested with it are the Sovereign.
(K. Notes: At this point, it seems as though Vattel is referring to the government as the sovereign. Prior to 1776; in the old world order that was the usual practice.
In these united States of America, literally started a new world order. The government gets its power from The Sovereign entity, called "the governed". We see this in the second paragraph of The unanimous Declaration, "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed".
It is the unified body of voters, in the majority of the total number [today we call them REGISTERED VOTERS], who are the Sovereign entity with authority to grant and adjust government powers. Then, those types of laws that the people have authorized the government to create are enforced on the individuals of that society.)
§ 2. Authority of the body politic over the members.
It is evident, that, by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body, in every thing that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member, therefore, essentially belongs to the body politic, or state; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according as the society may have ordained.
(K. Notes: This is important, "each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body, in every thing that relates to the common welfare". In these united States of America those things that relate to the common welfare are concretely tied to this phrase from The Declaration; "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men". If that political power does not connect to the equal protection of all citizen's rights our government is prohibited from exercising that power — because the governed people are prohibited from granting that power in the first place.
Contrary to popular misconception, the people, even if unanimous in consent, cannot honorably grant to government any powers that violate the rights of any individual or group of them, if they are not unjustly violating the rights of others. In this instance, we see the use of Imminent Domain as one such unjust power. The general practice is that government takes property from a citizen who has done nothing wrong. The taking, supposedly in the name of that which is "best for the community", removes the lawful ownership of the property and delivers it to the thieves who use the government to steal it for them.)
§ 3. Of the several kinds of government.
If the body of the nation keep in its own hands the empire, or the right to command, it is a Popular government, a Democracy; if it intrust it to a certain number of citizens, to a senate, it establishes an Aristocratic republic; finally, if it confide the government to a single person, the state becomes a Monarchy.
(K. Notes: This clause, "If the body of the nation keep in its own hands the empire, or the right to command, it is a Popular government, a Democracy" is exactly how these united States of America was established. We see this from The Declaration, in the phrase, "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed".
Then, we see the democratic form established in these united States of America, by way of the 1756 definition for Democracy. [One of the three forms of government ; that in which the sovereign power is lodged in the body of the people.] Unfortunately, it does not specify the other two forms.
This is exactly what The Declaration does for the united States citizens. It keeps the right to grant power to government in the hands of the governed people.
The people then hire, though elections, officers of government to manager the people's common affairs.)
These three kinds of government may be variously combined and modified. We shall not here enter into the particulars; this subject belonging to the public universal law; for the object of the present work, it is sufficient to establish the general principles necessary for the decision of those disputes that may arise between nations.
§ 4. What are sovereign states.
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without dependence on any foreign power, is a Sovereign State, Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other state. Such are the moral persons who live together in a natural society, subject to the law of nations. To give a nation a right to make an immediate figure in this grand society, it is sufficient that it be really sovereign and independent, that is, that it govern itself by its own authority and laws.
§ 5. States bound by unequal alliance.
We ought, therefore, to account as sovereign states those which have united themselves to another more powerful, by an unequal alliance, in which, as Aristotle says, to the more powerful is given more honor, and to the weaker, more assistance. The conditions of those unequal alliances may be infinitely varied, But whatever they are, provided the inferior ally reserve to itself the sovereignty, or the right of governing its own body, it ought to be considered as an independent state, that keeps up an intercourse with others under the authority of the law of nations.
§ 6. Or by treaties of protection.
Consequently a weak state, which, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under the protection of a more powerful one, and engages, in return, to perform several offices equivalent to that protection, without however divesting itself of the right of government and sovereignty, — that state, I say, does not, on this account, cease to rank among the sovereigns who acknowledge no other law than that of nations.
§ 7. Of tributary states.
There occurs no greater difficulty with respect to tributary states; for though the payment of tribute to a foreign power does in some degree diminish the dignity of those states, from its being a confession of their weakness, — yet it suffers their sovereignty to subsist entire. The custom of paying tribute was formerly very common, — the weaker by that means purchasing of their more powerful neighbor an exemption from oppression, or at that price securing his protection, without ceasing to be sovereigns.
§ 8. Of feudatory states.
The Germanic nations introduced another custom — that of requiring homage from a state either vanquished, or too weak to make resistance. Sometimes even, a prince has given sovereignties in fee, and sovereigns have voluntarily rendered themselves feudatories to others.
When the homage leaves independency and sovereign authority in the administration of the state, and only means certain duties to the lord of the fee, or even a mere honorary acknowledgment, it does not prevent the state or the feudatory prince being strictly sovereign. The king of Naples pays homage for his kingdom to the pope, and is nevertheless reckoned among the principal sovereigns of Europe,
§ 9. Of two states subject to the same prince.
Two sovereign states may also be subject to the same prince, without any dependence on each other, and each may retain all its rights as a free and sovereign state. The king of Prussia is sovereign prince of Neufchatel in Switzerland, without that principality being in any manner united to his other dominions; so that the people of Neufchatel, in virtue of their franchises, may serve a foreign power at war with the king of Prussia, provided that the war be not on account of that principality.
§ 10. Of states forming a federal republic.
Finally, several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state. They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfill engagements which he has voluntarily contracted.
(K. Notes: This paragraph exactly details what happened with these united States of America, especially as one reads The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America and The Articles of Confederation.)
Such were formerly the cities of Greece; such are at present the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, and such the members of the Helvetic body.
§ 11. Of a state that has passed under the dominion of another.
But a people that has passed under the dominion of another is no longer a state, and can no longer avail itself directly of the law of nations. Such were the nations and kingdoms which the Romans rendered subject to their empire; the generality even of those whom they honored with the name of friends and allies no longer formed real states. Within themselves they were governed by their own laws and magistrates; but without, they were in every thing obliged to follow the orders of Rome; they dared not of themselves either to make war or contract alliances; and could not treat with nations.
(K. Notes: This section seems accurately to describe the relationship between these united States of America [the nation] and "The United States of America" [the nation's government]. However, any state in this union, may of right secede from the union, without first obtaining the nation's government's permission. After that point of secession, may each state exercise all the same powers that they turned over to the nation's government.
That style of secession is what happen in these united State of America in the 1860's.)
§ 12. The objects of this treatise.
The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; free and independent states are moral persons, whose rights and obligations we are to establish in this treatise.
CHAPTER 2: General Principles of the Duties of a Nation Towards Itself
§ 13. A nation ought to act agreeably to its nature.
IF the rights of a nation spring from its obligations, it is principally from those that relate to itself. It will further appear, that its duties towards others depend very much on its duties towards itself, as the former are to be regulated and measured by the latter. As we are then to treat of the obligations and rights of nations, an attention to order requires that we should begin by establishing what each nation owes to itself.
The general and fundamental rule of our duties towards ourselves is, that every moral being ought to live in a manner conformable to his nature, naturae conveni enter vivere. A nation is a being determined by its essential attributes, that has its own nature, and can act in conformity to it. There are then actions of a nation as such, wherein it is concerned in its national character, and which are either suitable or opposite to what constitutes it a nation; so that it is not a matter of indifference whether it performs some of those actions, and omits others. In this respect, the Law of Nature prescribes it certain duties. We shall see, in this first book, what conduct a nation ought to observe, in order that it may not be wanting to itself. But we shall first sketch out a general idea of this subject.
§ 14. Of the preservation and perfection of a nation.
He who no longer exists can have no duties to perform: and a moral being is charged with obligations to himself, only with a view to his perfection and happiness: for to preserve and to perfect his own nature, is the sum of all his duties to himself.
The preservation of a nation consists in the duration of the political association by which it is formed. If a period is put to this association, the nation or state no longer subsists, though the individuals that composed it, still exist.
The perfection of a nation is found in what renders it capable of obtaining the end of civil society; and a nation is in a perfect state, when nothing necessary is wanting to arrive at that end. We know that the perfection of a thing consists, generally, in the perfect agreement of all its constituent parts to tend to the same end. A nation being a multitude of men united together in civil society — if in that multitude all conspire to attain the end proposed in forming a civil society, the nation is perfect; and it is more or less so, according as it approaches more or less to that perfect agreement. In the same manner its external state will be more or less perfect, according as it concurs with the interior perfection of the nation.
(K. Notes: This paragraph tends to define the phrase "a more perfect union", found in The Constitution's Preamble.)
§ 15. What is the end of civil society.
The end or object of civil society is to procure for the citizens whatever they stand in need of for the necessities, the conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in general, whatever constitutes happiness, — with the peaceful possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with security, and, finally, a mutual defense against all external violence.
It is now easy to form a just idea of the perfection of a state or nation: — every thing in it must conspire to promote the ends we have pointed out.
(K. Notes: It may be better states that the perfection of a civil society would be that every thing within it must conspire to promote the purpose for which it was created. That purpose, should be detailed in a written document for future generation to follow or to amend as they see fit.)
§ 16. A nation is under an obligation to preserve itself.
In the act of association, by virtue of which a multitude of men form together a state or nation, each individual has entered into engagements with all, to promote the general welfare; and all have entered into engagements with each individual, to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest that these reciprocal engagements can no otherwise be fulfilled than by maintaining the political association. The entire nation is then obliged to maintain that association; and as their preservation depends on its continuance, it thence follows that every nation is obliged to perform the duty of self-preservation.
(K. Notes: This phrase, "and all have entered into engagements with each individual, to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him" should not be taken to mean that each individual or even that the government is to provide for each citizen those things that might make them happy.
However, it should be understood that as member of a society, each member has a duty to help make sure that other members ar not unjustly hindered in the pursuit of their happiness. We see these concepts in the mutual pledge at the end of The Declaration; " And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."
This obligation, so natural to each individual of God's creation, is not derived to nations immediately from nature, but from the agreement by which civil society is formed: it is therefore not absolute, but conditional, — that is to say, it supposes a human act, to wit, the social compact. And as compacts may be dissolved by common consent of the parties — if the individuals that compose a nation should unanimously agree to break the link that binds them, it would be lawful for them to do so, and thus to destroy the state or nation; but they would doubtless incur a degree of guilt, if they took this step without just and weighty reasons; for civil societies are approved by the Law of Nature, which recommends them to mankind, as the true means of supplying all their wants, and of effectually advancing towards their own perfection. Moreover, civil society is so useful, nay so necessary to all citizens, that it may well be considered as morally impossible for them to consent unanimously to break it without necessity. But what citizens may or ought to do — what the majority of them may resolve in certain cases of necessity or of pressing exigency — are questions that will be treated of elsewhere: they cannot be solidly determined without some principles which we have not yet established. For the present, it is sufficient to have proved, that, in general, as long as the political society subsists, the whole nation is obliged to endeavor to maintain it.
(K. Notes: "that is to say, it supposes a human act, to wit, the social compact. And as compacts may be dissolved by common consent of the parties" is an interesting statement.
One could suppose it is the advice that the 1860's President Lincoln used to falsely force a party to remain in a union that they felt no longer protected their rights as equally as the other members.
According to the social contracts in play at the time, The Declaration and The U. S. Constitution, Lincoln's actions violated the terms of those contracts; The Declaration being the superior contract. It states: "When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
And then there is the 10th Constitutional Amendment, which states; "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." This simply means that since The Constitution does not prohibit the power or right of session to the state, the states may exercise that right; BUT only so long as the people have granted to their respective states the exercise of that power in accord with The Declaration's terms.)
§ 17. And to preserve its members.
If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less obliged carefully to preserve all its members. The nation owes this to itself, since the loss even of one of its members weakens it, and is injurious to its preservation. It owes this also to the members in particular, in consequence of the very act of association; for those who compose a nation are united for their defense and common advantage; and none can justly be deprived of this union, and of the advantages he expects to derive from it, while he on his side fulfills the conditions.
The body of a nation cannot then abandon a province, a town, or even a single individual who is a part of it, unless compelled to it by necessity, or indispensably obliged to it by the strongest reasons founded on the public safety.
§ 18. A nation has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation.
Since then a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation. For the Law of Nature gives us a right to every thing without which we cannot fulfill our obligation; otherwise it would oblige us to do impossibilities, or rather would contradict itself in prescribing us a duty, and at the same time debarring us of the only means of fulfilling it. It will doubtless be here understood, that those means ought not to be unjust in themselves, or such as are absolutely forbidden by the Law of Nature. As it is impossible that it should ever permit the use of such means, — if on a particular occasion no other present themselves for fulfilling a general obligation, the obligation must, in that particular instance, be looked on as impossible, and consequently void.
(K. Notes: That if the only means for government to accomplish a given task is an unjust action; than the task given must be void. Therefore, Eminent Domain, the unjust taking of property that others own, and usually against their will; must not be an option of government.)
§ 19. It ought to avoid every thing that might occasion its destruction.
By an evident consequence from what has been said, a nation ought carefully to avoid, as much as possible, whatever might cause its destruction, or that of the state, which is the same thing.
§ 20. Of its right to every thing that may promote this end.
A nation or state has a right to every thing that can help to ward off imminent danger, and kept at a distance whatever is capable of causing its ruin; and that from the very same reasons that establish its right to the things necessary to its preservation.
(K. Notes: It seems here that Vattel advocates for the government use of Eminent Domain.
There truly are so very few occasions where the government might need private property to preserve the nation. One such instance is if an individual possess a key defensive point, during times of actual war, that the government may, while that war last, take temporary possession of that land, but must return it in equal or better condition than it was then they took use of it. To take it for long than needed, is stealing.)
§ 21. A nation ought to perfect itself and the state.
The second general duty of a nation towards itself is to labor at its own perfection and that of its state. It is this double perfection that renders a nation capable of attaining the end of civil society: it would be absurd to unite in society, and yet not endeavor to promote the end of that union.
Here the entire body of a nation, and each individual citizen, are bound by a double obligation, the one immediately proceeding from nature, and the other resulting from their reciprocal engagements. Nature lays an obligation upon each man to labor after his own perfection; and in so doing, he labors after that of civil society, which could not fail to be very flourishing, were it composed of none but good citizens. But the individual finding in a well-regulated society the most powerful succors to enable him to fulfill the task which Nature imposes upon him in relation to himself, for becoming better, and consequently more happy — he is doubtless obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect.
(K. Notes: With this statement, "— he is doubtless obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect"; one common problem seem too popular. The person or people who have an excess abundance, without the consent of the remaining body of society; try to re-form that society as those individuals think best. This Best, tends to simply be more-profitable to those individuals.)
All the citizens who form a political society reciprocally engage to advance the common welfare, and as far as possible to promote the advantage of each member. Since then the perfection of the society is what enables it to secure equally the happiness of the body and that of the members, the grand object of the engagements and duties of a citizen is to aim at this perfection, This is more particularly the duty of the body collective in all their common deliberations, and in every thing they do as a body.
§ 22. And to avoid every thing contrary to its perfection.
A nation therefore ought to prevent, and carefully to avoid, whatever may hinder its perfection and that of the state, or retard the progress either of the one or the other.
§ 23. The rights it derives from these obligations.
We may then conclude, as we have done above in regard to the preservation of a state (§ 18), that a nation has a right to every thing without which it cannot attain the perfection of the members and of the state, or prevent and repel whatever is contrary to this double perfection.
§ 24. Examples.
On this subject, the English furnish us an example highly worthy of attention. That illustrious nation distinguishes itself in a glorious manner by its application to every thing that can render the state more flourishing. An admirable constitution there places every citizen in a situation that enables him to contribute to this great end, and everywhere diffuses that spirit of genuine patriotism which zealously exerts itself for the public welfare. We there see private citizens form considerable enterprises, in order to promote the glory and welfare of the nation. And while a bad prince would find his hands tied up, a wise and moderate king finds the most powerful aids to give success to his glorious designs. The nobles and the representatives of the people form a link of confidence between the monarch and the nation, and, concurring with him in every thing that tends to promote the public welfare, partly case him of the burden of government, give stability to his power, and procure him an obedience the more perfect, as it is voluntary. Every good citizen sees that the strength of the state is really the advantage of all, and not that of a single person. Happy constitution! which they did not suddenly obtain: it has cost rivers of blood; but they have not purchased it too dear. May luxury, that pest so fatal to the manly and patriotic virtues, that minister of corruption so dangerous to liberty, never overthrow a monument that does so much honor to human nature — a monument capable of teaching kings how glorious it is to rule over a free people!
There is another nation illustrious by its bravery and its victories. Its numerous and valiant nobility, its extensive and fertile dominions, might render it respectable throughout all Europe, and in a short time it might be in a most flourishing situation, but its constitution opposes this; and such is its attachment to that constitution, that there is no room to expect a proper remedy will ever be applied. In vain might a magnanimous king, raised by his virtues above the pursuits of ambition and injustice, from the most salutary designs for promoting the happiness of his people; — in vain might those designs be approved by the more sensible part, by the majority of the nation; — a single deputy, obstinate, or corrupted by a foreign power, might put a stop to all, and disconcert the wisest and most necessary measures. From an excessive jealousy of its liberty, that nation has taken such precautions as must necessarily place it out of the power of the king to make any attempts on the liberties of the public. But is it not evident that those precautions exceed the end proposed — that they tie the hands of the most just and wise prince, and deprive him of the means of securing the public freedom against the enterprises of foreign powers, and of rendering the nation rich and happy? Is it not evident that the nation has deprived itself of the power of acting, and that its councils are exposed to the caprice or treachery of a single member?
§ 25. A nation ought to know itself.
We shall conclude this chapter, with observing that a nation ought to know itself. Without this knowledge it cannot make any successful endeavors after its own perfection. It ought to have a just idea of its state, to enable it to take the most proper measures; it ought to know the progress it has already made, and what further advances it has still to make, — what advantages it possesses, and what defects it labors under, in order to preserve the former, and correct the latter. Without this knowledge a nation will act at random, and often take the most improper measures. It will think it acts with great wisdom in imitating the conduct of nations that are reputed wise and skillful, — not perceiving that such or such regulation, such or such practice, though salutary to one state, is often pernicious to another. Every thing ought to be conducted according to its nature. Nations cannot be well governed without such regulations as are suitable to their respective characters; and in order to this, their characters ought to be known.
(K. Notes: "A nation ought to know itself." Without this KNOWING, "It will think it acts with great wisdom in imitating the conduct of nations that are reputed wise and skillful, — not perceiving that such or such regulation, such or such practice, though salutary to one state, is often pernicious to another."
Such has become the fate of these united States of America. We claim to adhere to our founding principles, as we celebrate them every July 4th. Our actions follow the most popular government forms world-wide, but without plan to connect such practices to our design; and worse yet, without a notion to amend the design to accommodate those practices.
CHAPTER 3: Of the Constitution of a State, and the Duties and Rights of the Nation in this Respect WE were unable to avoid in the first chapter, anticipating something of the subject of this.
§ 26. Of public authority.
We have seen already that every political society must necessarily establish a public authority to regulate their common affairs, — to prescribe to each individual the conduct he ought to observe with a view to the public welfare, and to possess the means of procuring obedience. This authority essentially belongs to the body of the society; but it may be exercised in a variety of ways; and every society has a right to choose that mode which suits it best.
§ 27. What is the constitution of a state.
The fundamental regulation that determines the manner in which the public authority is to be executed, is what forms the constitution of the state. In this is seen the form in which the nation acts in quality of a body politic, how and by whom the people are to be governed, — and what are the rights and duties of the governors. This constitution is in fact nothing more than the establishment of the order in which a nation proposes to labor in common for obtaining those advantages with a view to which the political society was established.
§ 28. The nation ought to choose the best constitution.
The perfection of a state, and its aptitude to attain the ends of society, must then depend on its constitution: consequently the most important concern of a nation that forms a political society, and its first and most essential duty towards itself, is to choose the best constitution possible, and that most suitable to its circumstances. When it makes this choice, it lays the foundation of its own preservation, safety, perfection, and happiness: — it cannot take too much care in placing these on a solid basis.
§ 29. Of political, fundamental, and civil laws.
The laws are regulations established by public authority, to be observed in society. All these ought to relate to the welfare of the state and of the citizens. The laws made directly with a view to the public welfare are political laws; and in this class, those that concern the body itself and the being of the society, the form of government, the manner in which the public authority is to be exerted, — those, in a word, which together form the constitution of the state, are the fundamental laws.
(K. Notes: "in a word, which together form the constitution of the state, are the fundamental laws" is where The U. S. Constitution, Article 6 calls this fundamental law -- Supreme Law of the Land.)
The civil laws are those that regulate the rights and conduct of the citizens among themselves.
Every nation that would not be wanting to itself, ought to apply its utmost care in establishing these laws, and principally its fundamental laws, — in establishing them, I say, with wisdom in a manner suitable to the genius of the people, and to all the circumstances in which they may be placed: they ought to determine them and make them known with plainness and precision, to the end that they may possess stability, that they may not be eluded, and that they may create, if possible, no dissension — that, on the one hand, he or they to whom the exercise of the sovereign power is committed, and the citizens, on the other, may equally know their duty and their rights. It is not here necessary to consider in detail what that constitution and those laws ought to be: that discussion belongs to public law and politics. Besides, the laws and constitutions of different states must necessarily vary according to the disposition of the people and other circumstances. In the Law of Nations we must adhere to generals. We here consider the duty of a nation towards itself, principally to determine the conduct that it ought to observe in that great society which nature has established among all nations. These duties give it rights, that serve as a rule to establish what it may require from other nations, and reciprocally what others may require from it.
§ 30. Of the support of the constitution and obedience to the laws.
The constitution and laws of a state are the basis of the public tranquility, the firmest support of political authority, and a security for the liberty of the citizens. But this constitution is a vain phantom, and the best laws are useless, if they be not religiously observed: the nation ought then to watch very attentively, in order to render them equally respected by those who govern, and by the people destined to obey. To attack the constitution of the state and to violate its laws, is a capital crime against society; and if those guilty of it are invested with authority, they add to this crime a perfidious abuse of the power with which they are intrusted. The nation ought constantly to repress them with its utmost vigor and vigilance, as the importance of the case requires. It is very uncommon to see the laws and constitution of a state openly and boldly opposed: it is against silent and gradual attacks that a nation ought to be particularly on its guard. Sudden revolutions strike the imaginations of men: they are detailed in history; their secret springs are developed. But we overlook the changes that insensibly happen by a long train of steps that are but slightly marked. It would be rendering nations an important service to show from history how many states have thus entirely changed their nature, and lost their original constitution. This would awaken the attention of mankind: — impressed thenceforward with this excellent maxim (no less essential in politics than in morals) principiis obsta, — they would no longer shut their eyes against innovations, which, though inconsiderable in themselves, may serve as steps to mount to higher and more pernicious enterprises.
(K. Notes: The Declaration's second paragraph essentially covers all of the bases brought out in this section.
First the "bases" from this section, then the [remedy] from The Declaration or The Constitution:
"To attack the constitution of the state and to violate its laws, is a capital crime against society" [The Declaration: A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.]
"and if those guilty of it are invested with authority, they add to this crime a perfidious abuse of the power with which they are intrusted." [By definition from 1756; the use of political force against withstanders being the primary element of WAR; The Constitution, Article 3, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.]
"The nation ought constantly to repress them with its utmost vigor and vigilance, as the importance of the case requires." [That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.]
"It is very uncommon to see the laws and constitution of a state openly and boldly opposed: it is against silent and gradual attacks that a nation ought to be particularly on its guard." [Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.]
"Sudden revolutions strike the imaginations of men: they are detailed in history; their secret springs are developed. But we overlook the changes that insensibly happen by a long train of steps that are but slightly marked." [But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security]
"It would be rendering nations an important service to show from history how many states have thus entirely changed their nature, and lost their original constitution. This would awaken the attention of mankind: — impressed thenceforward with this excellent maxim (no less essential in politics than in morals) principiis obsta, — they would no longer shut their eyes against innovations, which, though inconsiderable in themselves, may serve as steps to mount to higher and more pernicious enterprises." [.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. ]
The unfortunate aspect about history, is that hose who refuse to learn the lesson from the past are doomed to repeat the mistakes from the past. The Declaration is supposed to be those past lessons. Unfortunately, we do not study those lesson towards the end of NOT repeating them.)
§ 31. The rights of a nation with respect to its constitution and government.
The consequences of a good or bad constitution being of such importance, and the nation being strictly obliged to procure, as far as is possible, the best and most convenient one, it has a right to every thing necessary to enable it to fulfill this obligation (§ 18). It is then manifest that a nation has an indisputable right to form, maintain, and perfect its constitution, to regulate at pleasure every thing relating to the government, and that no person can have a just right to hinder it. Government is established only for the sake of the nation, with a view to its safety and happiness.
§ 32. It may reform the government.
If any nation is dissatisfied with the public administration, it may apply the necessary remedies, and reform the government. But observe that I say "the nation;" for I am very far from meaning to authorize a few malcontents or incendiaries to give disturbance to their governors by exciting murmurs and seditions. None but the body of a nation have a right to check those at the helm when they abuse their power. When the nation is silent and obeys, the people are considered as approving the conduct of their superiors, or at least finding it supportable; and it is not the business of a small number of citizens to put the state in danger, under the pretense of reforming it.
(K. Notes: "When the nation is silent and obeys, the people are considered as approving the conduct of their superiors, or at least finding it supportable; and it is not the business of a small number of citizens to put the state in danger, under the pretense of reforming it."
The Declaration's phrase, consent of the governed makes it impossible for a voter to remain silent. The voter's supposed silence of not submitting a ballot -- is not silence at all, but a loud declaration of NON-CONSENT. In these united States of America, almost none of the people in any of our elected offices nationwide in all government levels and branches were elected with enough consenting votes.
Yet, through the government sponsored ignorance via the public indoctrination system we call schools; citizens are not taught, and far too few learn how our votes are supposed to be counted.)
§ 33. And may change the constitution.
In virtue of the same principles, it is certain that if the nation is uneasy under its constitution, it has a right to change it.
There can be no difficulty in the case, if the whole nation be unanimously inclined to make this change. But it is asked, what is to be done if the people are divided? In the ordinary management of the state, the opinion of the majority must pass without dispute for that of the whole nation: otherwise it would be almost impossible for the society ever to take any resolution. It appears then, by parity of reasoning, that a nation may change the constitution of the state by a majority of votes; and whenever there is nothing in this change that can be considered as contrary to the act of civil association, or to the intention of those united under it, the whole are bound to conform to the resolution of the majority. But if the question be, to quit a form of government to which alone it appeared that the people were willing to submit on their entering into the bonds of society, — if the greater part of a free people, after the example of the Jews in the time of Samuel, are weary of liberty, and resolved to submit to the authority of a monarch, — those citizens who are more jealous of that privilege, so invaluable to those who have tasted it, though obliged to suffer the majority to do as they please, are under no obligation at all to submit to the new government: they may quit a society which seems to have dissolved itself in order to unite again under another form: they have a right to retire elsewhere, to sell their lands, and take with them all their effects.
(K. Notes: Above, Vattel states, "It appears then, by parity of reasoning, that a nation may change the constitution of the state by a majority of votes." In these united States of America, it was decided that in order to make such constitutional changes, that 3/4 of the nation [3/4 of the total number of states] must be in agreement.)
§ 34. Of the legislative power, and whether it can change the constitution.
Here, again, a very important question presents itself. It essentially belongs to the society to make laws both in relation to the manner in which it desires to be governed, and to the conduct of the citizens: this is called the legislative power. The nation may intrust the exercise of it to the prince, or to an assembly and the prince jointly; who have then a right to make new laws and to repeal old ones. It is asked, whether their power extends to the fundamental laws — whether they may change the constitution of a state? The principals we have laid down lead us to decide with certainty, that the authority of those legislators does not extend so far, and that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change them. For the constitution of the state ought to possess stability: and since that was first established by the nation, which afterwards intrusted certain persons with the legislative power, the fundamental laws are expected from their commission. It is visible that the society only intended to make provision for having the state constantly furnished with laws suited to particular conjunctures, and, for that purpose, gave the legislature the power of abrogating the ancient civil and political laws that were not fundamental, and of making new ones; but nothing leads us to think that it meant to submit the constitution itself to their will. In short, it is from the constitution that those legislators derive their power: how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority? By the fundamental laws of England, the two houses of parliament, in concert with the king, exercise the legislative power: but, if the two houses should resolve to suppress themselves, and to invest the king with full and absolute authority, certainly the nation would not suffer it. And who would dare to assert that they would not have a right to oppose it? But if the parliament entered into a debate on making so considerable a change, and the whole nation was voluntarily silent upon it, this would be considered as an approbation of the act of its representatives.
(K. Notes: Vattel states: " it is from the constitution that those legislators derive their power: how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority?" and presents, "But if the parliament entered into a debate on making so considerable a change, and the whole nation was voluntarily silent upon it, this would be considered as an approbation of the act of its representatives."
In these united States of America, with The Declaration's contractual term of consent of the governed, should the people 'remain silent' so to speak, this cannot by any means signal that the people are in agreement. Since they literally have not consented then their silence is strong disagreement.
As to the first part of this note: Whether or not the people constitutionally allow the government officers to alter the constitution that governs their powers; would be as fool-hearty as parents allowing their children to dictate what the rules of the household are supposed to mean. Or worse yet, allow the jailed people and other criminal to dictate to society what the laws are supposed to mean.
Allowing government officers to 'interpret' the meaning of the constitution that governs their powers destroys the nation. We see this in these united States of America, which has allowed the supreme Court judges to dictate the meaning of The Constitution that governs their powers.)
§ 35. The nation ought not to attempt it without great caution.
But in treating here of the change of the constitution, we treat only of the right: the question of expediency belongs to politics. We shall therefore only observe in general, that great changes in a state being delicate and dangerous operations, and frequent changes being in their own nature prejudicial, a people ought to be very circumspect in this point, and never be inclined to make innovations without the most pressing reasons, or an absolute necessity. The fickleness of the Athenians was ever inimical to the happiness of the republic, and at length proved fatal to that liberty of which they were so jealous, without knowing, how to enjoy it.
(K. Notes: The Declaration directly addresses these concerns about the necessity for making constitutional changes; as well as addressing the warning about making changes to suit the fad of the day. It addresses these concerns in the second paragraph, with these words, "--That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [securing the peoples' rights], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.")
§ 36. It is the judge of all disputes relating to the government.
We may conclude from what has been said (§ 33), that if any disputes arise in a state respecting the fundamental laws, the public administration, or the rights of the different powers of which it is composed, it belongs to the nation alone to judge and determine them conformably to its political constitution.
(K. Notes: Not only is Vattel's point here logical, it would play this way in these united States of America:
Our nation's level of government would be regulated by 3/4 of the total number of States that make the nation.
Each state level of government would then in turn be governed (by example from the US Constitution) by 3/4 of all the counties that make the state.
Then, each county level government isw controlled by 3/4 of all the municipal level governments.
Next, in accord with The Declaration, every municipal level government [city, town, village, precinct, ward, etc.] would be controlled by the majority of 50%+1 of the total number of people registered as voters in that municipal jurisdiction.
Finally, since every Representative is by contract required to only act as the respective constitutions authorizes; there really is little to no need to have a formal body of legislators —other than the citizens themselves.
After all, there are so few instances; after so many millennia of humans with governments; that would require emergency legislative sessions.
The benefits of such direct legislative structure is that only the societies that actually pass such laws are bound by them, until such time a majority of communities in the next-larger jurisdiction pass the exact same acts and laws. Each legislative act, then naturally advances into larger political jurisdictions. By the time the legislative act becomes nationwide, the vast majority of citizens will have had their vote counted and nearly every citizens will have herard aobut it and know about it. As opposed to the somewhat secretive sessions at the national-level legislative houses where lobbyists and political action committees have greater influence with legislators than do their own constituents.
Buying votes with so few people in that legislative body [535 in the US Congress] is rather simple for a single rich person.
Imagine if the riches person on Earth wanted to buy enough votes to pass some law. They literally would have to buy a huge number of the total number of registered voter's votes. It is unlike that a group of 20 of the richest people on earth could buy enough votes to win a national campaign.)
§ 37. No foreign power has a right to interfere.
In short, all these affairs being solely a national concern, no foreign power has a right to interfere in them, nor ought to intermeddle with them otherwise than by its good offices unless requested to do it, or induced by particular reasons. If any intrude into the domestic concerns of another nation, and attempt to put a constraint on its deliberations, they do it an injury.
CHAPTER 4: Of the Sovereign, His Obligations, and His Rights
§ 38. Of the sovereign.
THE reader cannot expect to find here a long deduction of the rights of sovereignty, and the functions of a prince. These are to be found in treatises on the public law. In this chapter we only propose to show, in consequence of the grand principles of the law of nations, what a sovereign is, and to give a general idea of his obligations and his rights.
We have said that the sovereignty is that public authority which commands in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to perform, to obtain the end of its institution. This authority originally and essentially belonged to the body of the society, to which each member submitted, and ceded his natural right of conducting himself in every thing as he pleased, according to the dictates of his own understanding, and of doing himself justice. But the body of the society does not always retain in its own hands this sovereign authority: it frequently intrusts it to a senate, or to a single person. That senate, or that person, is then the sovereign.
(K. Notes: Vattel states, "the body of the society does not always retain in its own hands this sovereign authority: it frequently intrusts it to a senate, or to a single person. That senate, or that person, is then the sovereign." He tends to be mistaken on this point.
Simply because the society, or body of citizens grants to a body of legislators or king to pass laws and enforce them — this does not make that body or king the sovereign. It does in fact, make those, the servant to the citizen-body as a whole.
The Sovereignty always remains with the body of the citizens as a whole. In these united States of America, the people retained the sovereignty, delegating to government certain specific authority to exercise certain granted powers over the people and as representatives of the people to foreign powers and no more.
§ 39. It is solely established for the safety and advantage of society.
It is evident that men form a political society, and submit to laws, solely for their own advantage and safety. The sovereign authority is then established only for the common good of all the citizens; and it would be absurd to think that it could change its nature on passing into the hands of a senate or a monarch. Flattery, therefore, cannot, without rendering itself equally ridiculous and odious, deny that the sovereign is only established for the safety and advantage of society.
A good prince, a wise conductor of society, ought to have his mind impressed with this great truth, that the sovereign power is solely intrusted to him for the safety of the state, and the happiness of all the people; that he is not permitted to consider himself as the principal object in the administration of affairs, to seek his own satisfaction, or his private advantage; but that he ought to direct all his views, all his steps, to the greatest advantage of the state and people who have submitted to him. What a noble sight it is to see a king of England rendering his parliament an account of his principal operations — assuring that body, the representatives of the nation, that he has no other end in view than the glory of the state and the happiness of his people — and affectionately thanking all who concur with him in such salutary views! Certainly, a monarch who makes use of this language, and by his conduct proves the sincerity of his professions, is, in the opinion of the wise, the only great man. But, in most kingdoms, a criminal flattery has long since caused these maxims to be forgotten. A crowd of servile courtiers easily persuade a proud monarch that the nation was made for him, and not he for the nation. He soon considers the kingdom as a patrimony that is his own property, and his people as a herd of cattle from which he is to derive his wealth, and which he may dispose of to answer his own views, and gratify his passions. Hence those fatal wars undertaken by ambition, restlessness, hatred, and pride; — hence those oppressive taxes, whose produce is dissipated by ruinous luxury, or squandered upon mistresses and favorites; — hence, in fine, are important posts given by favor, while public merit is neglected, and every thing that does not immediately interest the prince is abandoned to ministers and subalterns. Who can, in this unhappy government, discover an authority established for the public welfare? A great prince will be on his guard even against his virtues. Let us not say, with some writers, that private virtues are not the virtues of kings — a maxim of superficial politicians, or of those who are very inaccurate in their expressions. Goodness, friendship, gratitude, are still virtues on the throne; and would to God they were always to be found there! But a wise king does not yield an undiscerning obedience to their impulse. He cherishes them, he cultivates them in his private life; but in state affairs he listens only to justice and sound policy. And why? because he knows that the government was intrusted to him only for the happiness of society, and that, therefore, he ought not to consult his own pleasure in the use he makes of his power. He tempers his goodness with wisdom; he gives to friendship his domestic and private favors; he distributes posts and employments according to merit; public rewards to services done to the state. In a word, he uses the public power only with a view to the public welfare. All this is comprehended in that fine saying of Lewis XII.: — "A king of France does not revenge the injuries of a duke of Orleans."
40. Of his representative character.
A political society is a moral person (Prelim. § 2) inasmuch as it has an understanding and a will, of which it makes use for the conduct of its affairs, and is capable of obligations and rights. When, therefore, a people confer the sovereignty on any one person, they invest him with their understanding and will, and make over to him their obligations and rights, so far as relates to the administration of the state, and to the exercise of the public authority. The sovereign, or conductor of the state, thus becoming the depositary of the obligations and rights relative to government, in him is found the moral person, who, without absolutely ceasing to exist in the nation, acts thenceforwards only in him and by him. Such is the origin of the representative character attributed to the sovereign. He represents the nation in all the affairs in which he may happen to be engaged as a sovereign. It does not debase the dignity of the greatest monarch to attribute to him this representative character; on the contrary, nothing sheds a greater luster on it, since the monarch thus unites in his own person all the majesty that belongs to the entire body of the nation.
(K. Notes: Vattel, as stated in other locations, confuses the authority granted by the Sovereign body, as though the Sovereignty itself has changed hands.
The Sovereignty always remains with the citizens. The citizens may, as they will, delegate certain powers to an individual or group to do for them as the majority of the citizens may direct. Thus, the government officers do not attain the title of Sovereignty in any way, except that of performing certain sovereign duties for the citizens.)
§ 41. He is intrusted with the obligations of the nation, and invested with its rights.
The sovereign, thus clothed with the public authority, with every thing that constitutes the moral personality of the nation, of course becomes bound by the obligations of that nation, and invested with its rights.
(K. Notes: Exception to this 'rule' exists, especially where written constitutions exist that detail the powers of that Government Officer do not permit that Officer to alter the powers granted.
In this manner, if the Government Officers considers it necessary to exercise a power not granted or beyond that which is granted; that Officer must stop at the point that is granted, or suffer punishments for violating the citizens by going beyond the authority granted by them.)
§ 42 His duty with respect to the preservation and perfection of the nation.
All that has been said in Chap. II. of the general duties of a nation towards itself particularly regards the sovereign. He is the depositary of the empire, and the power of commanding whatever conduces to the public welfare; he ought, therefore, as a tender and wise father, and as a faithful administrator, to watch for the nation, and take care to preserve it, and render it more perfect; to better its state, and to secure it, as far as possible, against every thing that threatens its safety or its happiness.
§ 43. His rights in this respect.
Hence all the rights which a nation derives from its obligation to preserve and perfect itself, and to improve its state, (see §§ 18, 20, and 23, of this book); all these rights, I say, reside in the sovereign, who is therefore indifferently called the conductor of the society, superior, prince, etc.
(K. Notes: The government is the 'orchestra'; the unified body of people, the conductor.
The unified body of the people is the Prince; the government officers are those selected to carry out the will of the unified body.)
§ 44. He ought to know the nation.
We have observed above, that every nation ought to know itself. This obligation devolves on the sovereign, since it is he who is to watch over the preservation and perfection of the nation. The duty which the law of nature here imposes on the conductors of nations is of extreme importance, and of considerable extent. They ought exactly to know the whole country subject to their authority; its qualities, defects, advantages, and situation with regard to the neighboring states; and they ought to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and general inclinations of their people, their virtues, vices, talents, etc. All these branches of knowledge are necessary to enable them to govern properly.
§ 45. The extent of his power. Prerogatives of majesty.
The prince derives his authority from the nation; he possesses just so much of it as they have thoughtproper to intrust him with. If the nation has plainly and simply invested him with the sovereignty, without limitation or division, he is supposed to be invested with all the prerogatives, without which the sovereign command or authority could not be exerted in the manner most conducive to the public welfare. These are called regal prerogatives, or the prerogatives of majesty.
§ 46. The prince ought to respect and support the fundamental laws.
But when the sovereign power is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws of the state, those laws show the prince the extent and bounds of his power, and the manner in which he is to exert it. The prince is therefore strictly obliged not only to respect, but also to support them. The constitution and the fundamental laws are the plan on which the nation has resolved to labor for the attainment of happiness; the execution is intrusted to the prince. Let him religiously follow this plan; let him consider the fundamental laws as inviolable and sacred rules; and remember that the moment he deviates from them, his commands become unjust, and are but a criminal abuse of the power with which he is intrusted. He is, by virtue of that power, the guardian and defender of the laws: and while it is his duty to restrain each daring violator of them, ought he himself to trample them under foot?
(K. Notes: This is excellent food for thought, both for the Sovereignty of the people, but also for those set into government offices, "Let him religiously follow this plan; let him consider the fundamental laws as inviolable and sacred rules; and remember that the moment he deviates from them, his commands become unjust, and are but a criminal abuse of the power with which he is intrusted. He is, by virtue of that power, the guardian and defender of the laws: and while it is his duty to restrain each daring violator of them, ought he himself to trample them under foot?")
§ 47. He may change the laws not fundamental.
If the prince be invested with the legislative power, he may, according to his wisdom, and when the public advantage requires it, abolish those laws that are not fundamental, and make new ones. (See what we have said on this subject in the preceding chapter, § 34.)
§ 48. He ought to maintain and observe the existing laws.
But while these laws exist, the sovereign ought religiously to maintain and observe them. They are the foundation of the public tranquility, and the firmest support of the sovereign authority. Every thing is uncertain, violent, and subject to revolutions, in those unhappy states where arbitrary power has placed her throne. It is therefore the true interest of the prince, as well as his duty, to maintain and respect the laws; he ought to submit to them himself. We find this truth established in a piece published by order of Lewis XIV., one of the most absolute princes that ever reigned in Europe. "Let it not be said that the sovereign is not subject to the laws of his state, since the contrary proposition is one of the truths of the law of nations, which flattery has sometimes attacked, and which good princes have always defended, as a tutelar divinity of their states."
§ 49. In what sense he is subject to the laws.
But it is necessary to explain this submission of the prince to the laws. First, he ought, as we have just seen, to follow their regulations in all the acts of his administration. In the second place, he is himself subject, in his private affairs, to all the laws that relate to property. I say, "in his private affairs;" for when he acts as a sovereign prince, and in the name of the state, he is subject only to the fundamental laws, and the law of nations. In the third place, the prince is subject to certain regulations of general polity, considered by the state as inviolable, unless he be excepted in express terms by the law, or tacitly by a necessary consequence of his dignity. I here speak of the laws that relate to the situation of individuals, and particularly of those that regulate the validity of marriages. These laws are established to ascertain the state of families: now the royal family is that of all others the most important to be certainly known. But, fourthly, we shall observe in general, with respect to this question, that, if the prince is invested with a full, absolute, and unlimited sovereignty, he is above the laws, which derive from him all their force; and he may dispense with his own observance of them, whenever natural justice and equity will permit him. Fifthly, as to the laws relative to morals and good order, the prince ought doubtless to respect them, and to support them by hisexample. But, sixthly, he is certainly above all civil penal laws, The majesty of a sovereign will not admit of his being punished like a private person; and his functions are too exalted to allow of his being molested under pretense of a fault that does not directly concern the government of the state.
(K. Notes: If the laws intended to govern the people are not fit for the chiefest of government officers; those laws must be removed and not enforced upon any person.
To allow government officers to violate the civil laws under the flag of official business is to nullify those law altogether; because the people are the official business of the government.)
§ 50. His person is sacred and inviolable.
It is not sufficient that the prince be above the penal laws: even the interest of nations requires that we should go something farther. The sovereign is the soul of the society; if he be not held in veneration by the people, and in perfect security, the public peace, and the happiness and safety of the state, are in continual danger. The safety of the nation then necessarily requires that the person of the prince be sacred and inviolable. The Roman people bestowed this privilege on their tribunes, in order that they might meet with no obstruction in defending them, and that no apprehension might disturb them in the discharge of their office. The cares, the employments of a sovereign, are of much greater importance than those of the tribunes were, and not less dangerous, if he be not provided with a powerful defense. It is impossible even for the most just and wise monarch not to make malcontents; and ought the state to continue exposed to the danger of losing so valuable a prince by the hand of an assassin? The monstrous and absurd doctrine, that a private person is permitted to kill a bad prince, deprived the French, in the beginning of the last century, of a hero who was truly the father of his people. Whatever a prince may be, it is an enormous crime against a nation to deprive them of a sovereign whom they think proper to obey.
(K. Notes: To assume that a nation cannot function it is chief government office be tried and punished for violating a civil law; that society is weak and not likely to stand, even if that officer remained unmolested while society is under attack.
There is question about this statement by Vattel: "it is an enormous crime against a nation to deprive them of a sovereign whom they think proper to obey." This assumes that an assassination of a prince deprives the people who may be so terrified of that prince they fear their live endangered if they should collectively act against the standing armies at the prince's command.
This is not to condone the assassin's actions, for the assassin, when caught, should be punished in accord with the standing laws. The assassin must be preserved to stand trial before an impartial jury, to weigh if the actions against the government officer were justified — or not.)
§ 51. But the nation may curb a tyrant, and withdraw itself from his obedience.
But this high attribute of sovereignty is no reason why the nation should not curb an insupportable tyrant, pronounce sentence on him (still respecting in his person the majesty of his rank) and withdraw itself from his obedience. To this indisputable right a powerful republic owes its birth. The tyranny exercised by Philip II. in the Netherlands excited those provinces to rise: seven of them, closely confederated, bravely maintained their liberties, under the conduct of the heroes of the House of Orange; and Spain, after several vain and ruinous efforts, acknowledged them sovereign and independent states. If the authority of the prince is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws, the prince, on exceeding the bounds prescribed him, commands without any right and even without a just title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may resist his unjust attempts....
(K. Notes: This statement is important: "the prince, on exceeding the bounds prescribed him, commands without any right and even without a just title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may resist his unjust attempts." This is the purpose for constitutions, literally, the Job Description-Sheet for key government offices. Officers violating the respective constitutions must be punished and/or removed from office and their unjust deed — undone.)
....As soon as a prince attacks the constitution of the state, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the people become free by the act of the sovereign, and can no longer view him but as a usurper who would load them with oppression. This truth is acknowledged by every sensible writer, whose pen is not enslaved by fear, or sold for hire. But some celebrated authors maintain, that if the prince is invested with the supreme command in a full and absolute manner, nobody has a right to resist him, much less to curb him, and that naught remains for the nation but to suffer and obey with patience. This is founded upon the supposition that such a sovereign is not accountable to any person for the manner in which he governs, and that if the nation might control his actions and resist him where it thinks them unjust, his authority would no longer be absolute; which would be contrary to this hypothesis. They say that an absolute sovereign completely possesses all the political authority of the society, which nobody can oppose; that, if he abuses it, he does ill indeed, and wounds his conscience; but that his commands are not the less obligatory, as being founded on a lawful right to command; that the nation, by giving him absolute authority, has reserved no share of it to itself, and has submitted to his discretion, etc. We might be content with answering, that in this light there is not any sovereign who is completely and fully absolute. But in order to remove all these vain subtleties, let us remember the essential end of civil society. Is it not to labor in concert for the common happiness of all? Was it not with this view that every citizen divested himself of his rights, and resigned his liberty? Could the society make such use of its authority as irrevocably to surrender itself and all its members to the discretion of a cruel tyrant? No, certainly, since it would no longer possess any right itself, if it were disposed to oppress a part of the citizens. When, therefore, it confers the supreme and absolute government, without an express reserve, it is necessarily with the tacit reserve that the sovereign shall use it for the safety of the people, and not for their ruin....
(K. Notes: Too often the people forget this concept: "When, therefore, it confers the supreme and absolute government, without an express reserve, it is necessarily with the tacit reserve that the sovereign shall use it for the safety of the people, and not for their ruin."
We see, that from The Declaration's second paragraph, that in these united States of America, the people have contractually made such reservation of power, and kept the power of recalling government officers and actions to right the nation.
We see that from The Preamble to The Constitution, and Amendment 9 of The Constitution that the people have also reserved their right to make the government more perfect; and have reserved to themselves ALL rights not enumerated within The Constitution. Also, by way of Article 5 in The Constitution, the people ultimately retain their right to amend the powers of the nation's government.)
....If he becomes the scourge of the state, he degrades himself; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself; and if he has carried his tyranny to the utmost height, why should even the life of so cruel and perfidious an enemy be spared? Who shall presume to blame the conduct of the Roman senate, that declared Nero an enemy to his country?
But it is of the utmost importance to observe, that this judgment can only be passed by the nation, or by a body which represents it, and that the nation itself cannot make any attempt on the person of the sovereign, except in cases of extreme necessity, and when the prince, by violating the laws, and threatening the safety of his people, puts himself in a state of war against them....
(K. Notes: All to often, the people forget this concept if the nation has had long periods of prosperity and mostly peace; "and that the nation itself cannot make any attempt on the person of the sovereign, except in cases of extreme necessity, and when the prince, by violating the laws, and threatening the safety of his people, puts himself in a state of war against them." The people tend to become too forgiving of the government officer's violations against The Constitution. This forgiveness opens the door wider for future politician in the same office to expand upon those violations of the predecessor.)
....It is the person of the sovereign, not that of an unnatural tyrant and a public enemy, that the interest of the nation declares sacred and inviolable. We seldom see such monsters as Nero. In the more common cases, when a prince violates the fundamental laws; when he attacks the liberties and privileges of his subjects; or (if he be absolute) when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation;...
(K. Notes: These are the types of government violations that have become all too common within these united States of America, "In the more common cases, when a prince violates the fundamental laws; when he attacks the liberties and privileges of his subjects; or (if he be absolute) when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation;" and still, we do nothing.)
...it may resist him, pass sentence on him, and withdraw from his obedience; but though this may be done, still his person should be spared, and that for the welfare of the state. It is above a century since the English took up arms against their king, and obliged him to descend from the throne. A set of able, enterprising men, spurred on by ambition, took advantage of the terrible ferment caused by fanaticism and party spirit; and Great Britain suffered her sovereign to die unworthily on a scaffold. The nation coming to itself discovered its former blindness. If, to this day, it still annually makes a solemn atonement, it is not only from the opinion that the unfortunate Charles I. did not deserve so cruel a fate, but, doubtless, from a conviction that the very safety of the state requires the person of the sovereign to be held sacred and inviolable, and that the whole nation ought to render this maxim venerable, by paying respect to it when the care of its own preservation will permit.
(K. Notes: Vattel seems slightly backwards on this account: "that the very safety of the state requires the person of the sovereign to be held sacred and inviolable". For it is the office that should be held sacred. Any person violating the powers of that office should be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law — including death.)
One word more on the distinction that is endeavored to be made here in favor of an absolute sovereign. Whoever has well weighed the force of the indisputable principles we have established, will be convinced, that when it is necessary to resist a prince who has become a tyrant, the right of the people is still the same, whether that prince was made absolute by the laws, or was not; because that right is derived from what is the object of all political society — the safety of the nation, which is the supreme law. But, if the distinction of which we are treating is of no moment with respect to the right, it can be of none in practice, with respect to expediency. As it is very difficult to oppose an absolute prince, and it cannot be done without raising great disturbances in the state, and the most violent and dangerous commotions, it ought to be attempted only in cases of extremity, when the public miseries are raised to such a height that the people may say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel bello bene niutari, that it is better to expose themselves to a civil war than to endure them. But if the prince's authority is limited, if it in some respects depends on a senate, or a parliament that represents the nation, there are means of resisting and curbing him, without exposing the state to violent shocks. When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, there can be no reason for waiting until it becomes extreme.
(K. Notes: This statement is very similar to the structure within these united States of America; "But if the prince's authority is limited, if it in some respects depends on a senate, or a parliament that represents the nation, there are means of resisting and curbing him, without exposing the state to violent shocks. When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, there can be no reason for waiting until it becomes extreme."
The problem even here, is that citizens refuse to remember this warning from The Declaration, "all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." We do nothing about the ills and evils by our "representatives," while in office, as they too become part of the problem against the solution, by doing nothing to stop corruption.)
§ 52. Arbitration between the king and his subjects.
But however limited a prince's authority may be, he is commonly very jealous of it; it seldom happens that he patiently suffers resistance, and peaceably submits to the judgement of his people. Can he want support, while he is the distributor of favors? We see too many base and ambitious souls, for whom the state of a rich and decorated slave has more charms than that of a modest and virtuous citizen. It is therefore always difficult for a nation to resist a prince and pronounce sentence on his conduct, without exposing the state to dangerous troubles, and to shocks capable of overturning it. This has sometimes occasioned a compromise between the prince and the subjects, to submit to the decision of a friendly power all the disputes that might arise between them. Thus the kings of Denmark, by solemn treaties, formerly referred to those of Sweden the differences that might arise between them and their senate; and this the kings of Sweden have also done with regard to those of Denmark. The princes and states of West Friesland, and the burgesses of Embden, have in the same manner constituted the republic of the United Provinces the judge of their differences. The princes and the city of Neufchatel established, in 1406, the canton of Berne perpetual judge and arbitrator of their disputes. Thus also, according to the spirit of the Helvetic confederacy, the entire body takes cognizance of the disturbances that arise in any of the confederated states, though each of them is truly sovereign and independent.
§ 53. The obedience which subjects owe to a sovereign.
As soon as a nation acknowledges a prince for its lawful sovereign, all the citizens owe him a faithful obedience. He can neither govern the state, nor perform what the nation expects from him, if he be not punctually obeyed. Subjects then have no right, in doubtful cases, to examine the wisdom or justice of their sovereign's commands; this examination belongs to the prince: his subjects ought to suppose (if there be a possibility of supposing it) that all his orders are just and salutary: he alone is accountable for the evil that may result from them.
(K. Notes: Regarding, "Subjects then have no right, in doubtful cases, to examine the wisdom or justice of their sovereign's commands;" as there is a distinction between that of subjects and that of Citizens, the citizens is a member of the body Sovereign and the 'prince' or government officer is merely the employee of the body Sovereign. Every member of the Sovereign body has a duty to question the authority of the 'prince' or government officer, especially when the officer's actions violate The Constitution. Without this ability to challenge unjust actions of government officers, there can be no REAL checks to balance the power against the officers who abuse their position.)
§ 54. In what cases they may resist him.
Nevertheless this ought not to be entirely a blind obedience. No engagement can oblige, or even authorize, a man to violate the law of nature. All authors who have any regard to conscience or decency agree that no one ought to obey such commands as are evidently contrary to that sacred law. Those governors of places who bravely refused to execute the barbarous orders of Charles IX. on the memorable day of St. Bartholomew, have been universally praised; and the court did not dare to punish them, at least openly. "Sire," said the brave Orte, governor of Bayonne, in his letter, "I have communicated your majesty's command to your faithful inhabitants and warriors in the garrison; and I have found there only good citizens and brave soldiers, but not a single executioner: wherefore both they and I most humbly entreat your majesty to be pleased to employ our hands and our lives in things that are possible, however hazardous they may be; and we will exert ourselves to the last drop of our blood in the execution of them." The Count de Tende, Charny, and others, replied to those who brought them the orders of the court, "that they had too great a respect for the king, to believe that such barbarous orders came from him."
(K. Notes: "Nevertheless this ought not to be entirely a blind obedience."
When it comes to the military and most police officers within these united States of America, the swearing in oath is first to The Constitution; and then to the orders; against enemies foreign AND DOMESTIC.
The unfortunate aspect, during training, is that the new recruits are indoctrinated to blindly follow orders; to not ask questions.
Worse than that, they are not taught how to recognize the REAL domestic enemies that include; legislators who pass laws that violate The Constitution, executive officers enforce those laws and unconstitutional orders; as well as the courts who all to frequently punish people for violating unconstitutional laws.
Quite the contrary. They are taught that "domestic enemies" are the civilians and other government personnel who resist unjust government actions.)
It is more difficult to determine in what cases a subject may not only refuse to obey, but even resist a sovereign, and oppose his violence by force. When a sovereign does injury to any one, he acts without any real authority; but we ought not thence to conclude hastily that the subject may resist him. The nature of sovereignty, and the welfare of the state, will not permit citizens to oppose a prince whenever his commands appear to them unjust or prejudicial. This would be falling back into the state of nature, and rendering government impossible. A subject ought patiently to suffer from the prince doubtful wrongs, and wrongs that are supportable; the former, because whoever has submitted to the decision of a judge, is no longer capable of deciding his own pretensions; and as to those that are supportable, they ought to be sacrificed to the peace and safety of the state, on account of the great advantages obtained by living in society. It is presumed, as matter of course, that every citizen has tacitly engaged to observe this moderation; because, without it, society could not exist. But when the injuries are manifest and atrocious, — when a prince, without any apparent reason attempts to deprive us of life, or of those things the loss of which would render life irksome, who can dispute our right to resist him? Self-preservation is not only a natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and absolutely renounce it. And though he might give it up, can he be considered as having done it by his political engagements since he entered into society only to establish his own safety upon a more solid basis? The welfare of society does not require such a sacrifice; and, as Barbeyrac well observes in his notes on Grotius, "If the public interest requires that those who obey should suffer some inconvenience, it is no less for the public interest that those who command should be afraid of driving their patience to the utmost extremity." The prince who violates all laws, who no longer observes any measures, and who would in his transports of fury take away the life of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend themselves. The person of the sovereign is sacred and inviolable: but he who, after having lost all the sentiments of a sovereign, divests himself even of the appearances and exterior conduct of a monarch, degrades himself: he no longer retains the sacred character of a sovereign, and cannot retain the prerogatives attached to that exalted rank. However, if this prince is not a monster, — if he is furious only against us in particular, and from the effects of a sudden transport or a violent passion, and is supportable to the rest of the nation, the respect we ought to pay to the tranquility of the state is such, and the respect due to sovereign majesty so powerful, that we are strictly obliged to seek every other means of preservation, rather than to put his person in danger. Every one knows the example set by David: he fled, — he kept himself concealed, to secure himself from Saul's fury, and more than once spared the life of his persecutor. When the reason of Charles VI. of France was suddenly disordered by a fatal accident, he in his fury killed several of those who surrounded him: none of them thought of securing his own life at the expense of that of the king; they only endeavored to disarm and secure him. They did their duty like men of honor and faithful subjects, in exposing their lives to save that of this unfortunate monarch: such a sacrifice is due to the state and to sovereign majesty: furious from the derangement of his faculties, Charles was not guilty: he might recover his health, and again become a good king.
(K. Notes: That entire paragraph is dissected to reveal the where The Declaration solves those issues.
Regarding this statement from above: "It is more difficult to determine in what cases a subject may not only refuse to obey, but even resist a sovereign, and oppose his violence by force." First, there is a certain distinction between that of subjects and that of citizens; though in more modern times, they seem mostly interchangeable. A citizen is considered a free person; whereas a subject is bound to the sovereign. In these united States of America, it is the body of registered voters, in the majority, that is The Sovereign with respect to controlling government powers. We know this is fact, because The Declaration states, "Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" [those who register as voters.]
Regarding this section: "When a sovereign does injury to any one, he acts without any real authority; but we ought not thence to conclude hastily that the subject may resist him. The nature of sovereignty, and the welfare of the state, will not permit citizens to oppose a prince whenever his commands appear to them unjust or prejudicial. This would be falling back into the state of nature, and rendering government impossible." The conflict here is that there are two parties, the offender and the offended. If the government member is the offender, and the offended has constitutional evidence that the power exercised against them is unconstitutional; whether judges agree or not; it is the duty of the offended to bring light against the offender, in hopes to shed light on the issue, discover is there are more such offenses, and unify the body of the people to put an end to it. This we get from the pledge at the end of The Declaration, which states; "And for support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other, our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor." Every individual is responsible for holding our government officers accountable.
This section of the paragraph is most important, as The Declaration gives better advice that opposes Vattel. "A subject ought patiently to suffer from the prince doubtful wrongs, and wrongs that are supportable; the former, because whoever has submitted to the decision of a judge, is no longer capable of deciding his own pretensions; and as to those that are supportable, they ought to be sacrificed to the peace and safety of the state, on account of the great advantages obtained by living in society." The Declaration warns that, "all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while those evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the form to which they have become accustomed." We are NOT to become accustomed to government wrongs against us, no matter how minor those wrongs may seem — and especially – when those wrongs are in violation against The Constitution.
This section is curious and also contrary to the establishment concerning these united States of America. "It is presumed, as matter of course, that every citizen has tacitly engaged to observe this moderation; because, without it, society could not exist."
The Declaration also address is section, "But when the injuries are manifest and atrocious, — when a prince, without any apparent reason attempts to deprive us of life, or of those things the loss of which would render life irksome, who can dispute our right to resist him?" with the statement, "But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security"
This seems to be the intent of establishing these united states of America, "If the public interest requires that those who obey should suffer some inconvenience, it is no less for the public interest that those who command should be afraid of driving their patience to the utmost extremity." To keep government officers fully aware that the body of the governed IS the Sovereign Authority over government.
The Declaration also deals with this section as well: "The prince who violates all laws, who no longer observes any measures, and who would in his transports of fury take away the life of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend themselves." However, The Declaration does not encourage waiting for government officers to violate all laws, which would qualify as a long train of abuses and usurpation. The Declaration encourages the people to act thusly, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government".
This is particularly curious, especially as it relates to these united States of America. "The person of the sovereign is sacred and inviolable:" The sovereign person in these united states of America, is the body of the majority of the total number of registered voters. Then, Vattel continues with, "but he [the sovereign] who, after having lost all the sentiments of a sovereign, divests himself even of the appearances and exterior conduct of a monarch, degrades himself: he no longer retains the sacred character of a sovereign, and cannot retain the prerogatives attached to that exalted rank." With that, it can be said that when registered voters begin granting to their government powers that unjustly violate other people's rights; those citizens should be prohibited from exercising any portion of the Sovereign-Vote.
The united States of America has solved the following problem as well: "However, if this prince is not a monster, — if he is furious only against us in particular, and from the effects of a sudden transport or a violent passion, and is supportable to the rest of the nation, the respect we ought to pay to the tranquility of the state is such, and the respect due to sovereign majesty so powerful, that we are strictly obliged to seek every other means of preservation, rather than to put his person in danger." This is done by have a body of supposed trustworthy people in offices who are looking out for the citizen's best interest and The Constitution, that they have the power to temporarily or permanently remove an officer from government. This power is the Impeachment power, as well as the incompetency power.)
§ 55. Of ministers.
What has been said is sufficient for the intention of this work: the reader may see these questions treated more at large in many books that are well known. We shall conclude this subject with an important observation. A sovereign is undoubtedly allowed to employ ministers to ease him in the painful offices of government; but he ought never to surrender his authority to them. When a nation chooses a conductor, it is not with a view that he should deliver up his charge into other hands.
Ministers ought only to be instruments in the hands of the prince; he ought constantly to direct them, and continually endeavor to know whether they act according to his intentions. If the imbecility of age. or any infirmity, render him incapable of governing, a regent ought to be nominated, according to the laws of the state: but when once the sovereign is capable of holding the reins, let him insist on being served, but never suffer himself to be superseded. The last kings of France of the first race surrendered to government and authority to the mayors of the palace: thus becoming mere phantoms, they justly lost the title and honors of a dignity of which they had abandoned the functions. The nation has every thing to gain in crowning an all-powerful minister, for he will improve that soil as his own inheritance, which he plundered whilst he only reaped precarious advantages from it.
(K, Notes: This is interesting, "The nation has every thing to gain in crowning an all-powerful minister, for he will improve that soil as his own inheritance, which he plundered whilst he only reaped precarious advantages from it." Interesting, in that, since the Vattel times, we have seen king after king and queen after queen do more damage to their nation than good.
Even a body of registered voters, who remain ignorant of the nation's design, may destroy the very country they depend upon for their continued survival.)
CHAPTER 5: Of States Elective, Successive or Hereditary, and of Those Called Patrimonial
§ 56 Of elective states.
WE have seen in the preceding chapter, that it originally belongs to a nation to confer the supreme authority, and to choose the person by whom it is to be governed. If it confers the sovereignty on him for his own person only, reserving to itself the right of choosing a successor after the sovereign's death, the state is elective. As soon as the prince is elected according to the laws, he enters into the possession of all the prerogatives which those laws annex to his dignity.
(K. Notes: This is an interesting sentence, "WE have seen in the preceding chapter, that it originally belongs to a nation to confer the supreme authority, and to choose the person by whom it is to be governed." Interesting, because in these united States of America, the body of the governed people have retained the Sovereign Authority, delegating to elected government officers certain powers to exercise on behalf of the people in their jurisdiction.
This is proved in The Declaration's 2nd Paragraph, government get their power from the people, and that the people posses the right to alter or abolish that government that fails to secure their rights.
This is also present in The Constitution, Preamble, where the people ordain The Constitution; Amendment 9, where all the peoples' rights not listed are protected against ANY government interference from any level or branch; and Amendment 10, that tells the government that they do not possess any power unless the people first frant that power to the.)
§ 57. Whether elective kings are real sovereigns.
It has been debated, whether elective kings and princes are real sovereigns. But he who lays any stress on this circumstance must have only a very confused idea of sovereignty. The manner in which a prince obtains his dignity has nothing to do with determining its nature. We must consider, first, whether the nation itself forms an independent society (see chap 1), and secondly, what is the extent of the power it has intrusted to the prince. Whenever the chief of an independent state really represents his nation, he ought to be considered as a true sovereign (§ 40), even though his authority should be limited in several respects.
(K. Noted: Based on the 1756 definition for Sovereign; as we see below; it is Vattel who "must have only a very confused idea of sovereignty".
As we see, SOVEREIGN is defined as: "1: Supreme in power; having no superior."
Specific to these united States of America, that political entity that is Supreme in power, and has no superior is that of the body of the people, called the governed. This body may giver or withhold their consent. The give or withhold consent by way of voting.
Therefore, it now is, the majority of the total body of registered voters that is THE SOVEREIGN within these united States of America. But... this sovereignty is limited by contract. The Contract is The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America. The contract may be amended by a unanimous vote of all the States in the union, at the time the amendment process has started.
Our government officers, not even the President can ever be see as a sovereign entity, as all offices are merely at the pleasure of the body of registered voters, which is The Sovereign in our nation.)
§ 58. Of successive and hereditary states. The origin of the right of succession.
When a nation would avoid the troubles which seldom fail to accompany the election of a sovereign, it makes its choice for a long succession of years, by establishing the right of succession, or by rendering the crown hereditary in a family, according to the order and rules that appear most agreeable to that nation. The name of an Hereditary State or Kingdom is given to that where the successor is appointed by the same law that regulates the successions of individuals. The Successive Kingdom is that where a person succeeds according to a particular fundamental law of the state. Thus the lineal succession, and of males alone, is established in France.
§ 59. Other origin of that right.
The right of succession is not always the primitive establishment of a nation; it may have been introduced by the concession of another sovereign, and even by usurpation. But when it is supported by long possession, the people are considered as consenting to it; and this tacit consent renders it lawful, though the source be vicious. It rests then on the foundation we have already pointed out — a foundation that alone is lawful and incapable of being shaken, and to which we must ever revert.
(K, Notes: This is a curious comment; " But when it is supported by long possession, the people are considered as consenting to it; and this tacit consent renders it lawful". Curious, in that if a people are conquered and unable to resist an unjust ruler, it may be some years or generations before they unify enough to take back their right to rule themselves.
Vattel seems to be claiming that might, makes right. This seems to have never set well in humanity — except for those who exercise an unjust taking from others.)
§ 60. Other sources, which still amount to the same thing.
The same right, according to Grotius and the generality of writers, may be derived from other sources, as conquest, or the right of a proprietor, who, being master of a country, should invite inhabitants to settle there, and give them lands, on condition of their acknowledging him and his heirs for their sovereigns. But as it is absurd to suppose that a society of man can place themselves in subjection otherwise than with a view to their own safety and welfare, and still more that they can bind their posterity on any other footing, it ultimately amounts to the same thing; and it must still be said that the succession is established by the express will, or the tacit consent of the nation, for the welfare and safety of the state.START HERE
§ 61. A nation may change the order of the succession.
It thus remains an undeniable truth, that in all cases the succession is established or received only with a view to the public welfare and the general safety. If it happened then that the order established in this respect became destructive to the state, the nation would certainly have a right to change it by a new law. Salus populi supreme lex, the safety of the people is the supreme law; and this law is agreeable to the strictest justice, the people having united in society only with a view to their safety and greater advantage.
(K. Notes: But they are only able to do this when unified. But even unification may need outside assistance from other countries.)
§ 62. Renunciations.
§ 63. The order of succession ought commonly to be observed.
§ 64. Regents.
§ 65. Indivisibility of sovereignties.
§ 66. Who are to decide disputes respecting the succession to a sovereignty.
§ 67. The right of succession not to depend on the judgment of a foreign power.
§ 68. States called patrimonial.
§ 69. Every true sovereignty is unalienable.
§ 70. Duty of a prince who is empowered to nominate his successor.
§ 71. His nomination must be sanctioned by at least the tacit ratification of the people.
CHAPTER 6: Principal Objects of a Good Government; and First to Provide for the Necessities of the Nation
§ 72. The object of society points out the duties of the sovereign.
§ 73. to take care that there be a sufficient number of workmen.
§ 74. to prevent the emigration of those that are useful.
§ 75. Emissaries who entice them away.
§ 76. Labour and industry must be encouraged.
CHAPTER 7: Of The Cultivation of The Soil
§ 77. The utility of tillage.
§ 78. Regulations necessary in that respect:—for the distribution of land.
§ 79. for the protection of husbandmen.
§ 80. Husbandry ought to be placed in an honourable light.
§ 81. Cultivation of the soil a natural obligation.
§ 82. Public granaries.
CHAPTER 8: Of Commerce
§ 83. Of home and foreign trade.
§ 84. Utility of domestic trade.
§ 85. Utility of foreign trade.
§ 86. Obligation to cultivate domestic trade.
§ 87. Obligation to carry on foreign trade.
§ 88. Foundation of the laws of commerce:—right of purchasing.
§ 89. Right of selling.
§ 90. Prohibition of foreign merchandises.
§ 91. Nature of the right of purchasing.
§ 92. Each nation to determine for herself how she will carry on commerce.
§ 93. How a nation acquires a perfect right to a foreign trade.
§ 94. Simple permission to carry on trade.
§ 95. Whether commercial rights be subject to prescription.
§ 96. Imprescriptibility of rights founded on treaty.
§ 97. Monopolies, and trading companies with exclusive privileges.
§ 98. Balance of trade, and attention of government in that respect.
§ 99. Import duties.
CHAPTER 9: Of the Care of the Public Ways of Communication, and the Right of Toll
§ 100. Utility of highways, canals, etc.
§ 101. Duty of government in that respect.
§ 102. Its rights in that respect.
§ 103. Foundation of the right to demand toll.
§ 104. Abuse of that right.
CHAPTER 10: Of Money and Exchange
§ 105. Establishment of money.
§ 106. Duty of the nation or prince with respect to the coin.
§ 107. Their rights in that respect.
§ 108. How one nation may injure another in the article of coin.
§ 109. Exchange, and commercial laws.
CHAPTER 11: Second Object of a Good Government, — to Procure the True Happiness of the Nation
§ 110. A nation ought to labor after its own happiness.
§ 111. Instruction.
§ 112. Education of youth.
§ Arts and sciences.
§ Freedom of philosophical discussion.
§ Love of virtue, and abhorrence of vice, to be excited.
§ 116. The nation may hence discover the intention of her rulers.
§ 117. The nation, or public person, bound to perfect her understanding and will.
§ 118. and to direct the knowledge and virtues of the citizens to the welfare of the society.
§ 119. Love for their country.
§ 120. in individuals.
§ 121. in the nation or state itself, and in the sovereign.
§ 122. Definition of the term, “country,”.
§ 123. How shameful and criminal to injure our country.
§ 124. The glory of good citizens.—Examples.
CHAPTER 12: Of Piety and Religion
§ 125. Of piety.
§ 126. It ought to be attended with knowledge.
§ 127. Religion, internal and external.
§ 128. Rights of individuals:—liberty of conscience.
§ 129. Public establishment of religion:—rights and duties of the nation.
§ 130. when there is as yet no established religion.
§ 131. when there is an established religion.
§ 132. Duties and rights of the sovereign with respect to religion.
§ 133. where there is an established religion.
§ 134. Objects of his care, and the means he ought to employ.
§ 135. Toleration.
§ 136. How the prince is to act when the nation is resolved to change her religion.
§ 137. Difference of religion does not deprive a prince of his crown.
§ 138. Duties and rights of the sovereign reconciled with those of the subjects.
§ 139. The sovereign ought to have the inspection of the affairs of religion, and authority over those who teach it.
§ 140. He is bound to prevent the abuse of the established religion.
§ 141. His authority over the ministers of religion.
§ 142. Nature of that authority.
§ 143. Rule to be observed with respect to ecclesiastics.
§ 144. Recapitulation of the reasons which establish the sovereign’s rights in matters of religion, 64— Authorities and examples.
§ 145. Pernicious consequences of the contrary opinion.
§ 146. Abuses particularised.—1. The power of the popes.
§ 147. 2. Important employments conferred by a foreign power.
§ 148. 3. Powerful subjects dependent on a foreign court.
§ 149. 4. Celibacy of the priests:—Convents.
§ 150. 5. Enormous pretensions of the clergy:— Pre-eminence.
§ 151. 6. Independence, immunities.
§ 152. 7. Immunity of church possessions.
§ 153. 8. Excommunication of men in office.
§ 154. 9. and of sovereigns themselves.
§ 155. 10. The clergy drawing every thing to themselves, and interrupting the course of justice.
§ 156. 11. Money drawn to Rome.
§ 157. 12. Laws and customs inimical to the welfare of states.
CHAPTER 13: Of Justice And Polity
§ 158. A nation ought to make justice reign.
§ 159. to establish good laws.
§ 160. to enforce them.
§ 161. Functions and duties of the prince in that respect.
§ 162. How he is to dispense justice.
§ 163. His duty to appoint upright and enlightened judges.
§ 164. The ordinary courts should determine causes relating to the revenue.
§ 165. Necessary to establish supreme courts, from whose sentence there shall be no appeal.
§ 166. The prince bound to observe the forms of justice.
§ 167. to support the authority of the judges, and enforce their decrees.
§ 168. Distributive justice:—distribution of employments and rewards.
§ 169. Punishment of transgressors:—foundation of the right of punishing.
§ 170. Criminal laws.
§ 171. Degree of punishment.
§ 172. Execution of the laws.
§ 173. Right of pardoning.
§ 174. Internal police.
§ 175. Duel or single combat.
§ 176. Means of putting a stop to that disorder.
CHAPTER 14: The Third Object of a Good Government, — To Fortify Itself Against External Attacks
§ 177. A nation ought to fortify itself against external attacks.
§ 178. National strength.
§ 179. Increase of population.
§ 180. Valour.
§ 181. Other military virtues.
§ 182. Riches.
§ 183. Public revenues and taxes.
§ 184. The nation ought not to increase her power by unlawful means.
§ 185. Power is but relative.
CHAPTER 15: Of the Glory of a Nation
§ 186. Advantages of glory.
§ 187. Duty of the nation.—How true glory is acquired.
§ 188. Duty of the prince.
§ 189. Duty of the citizens.
§ 190. Example of the Swiss.
§ 191. Attacking the glory of a nation is doing her an injury.
CHAPTER 16: Of the Protection Sought by a Nation, and Its Voluntary Submission to a Foreign Power
§ 192. Protection.
§ 193. Voluntary submission of one nation to another.
§ 194. Several kinds of submission.
§ 195. Right of the citizens when the nation submits to a foreign power.
§ 196. These compacts annulled by the failure of protection.
§ 197. or by the infidelity of the party protected.
§ 198. and by the encroachments of the protector.
§ 199. How the right of the nation protected is lost by her silence.
CHAPTER 17: How a Nation May Separate Itself from the State of Which it Is a Member, or Renounce its Allegiance to its Sovereign When it Is Not Protected
§ 200. Difference between the present case and those in the preceding chapter.
§ 200. Difference between the present case and those in the preceding chapter.
§ 201. Duty of the members of a state, or subjects of a prince, who are in danger.
§ 202. Their right when they are abandoned.
CHAPTER 18: Of the Establishment of a Nation in a Country
§ 203. Possession of a country by a nation.
§ 204. Her right over the part in her possession.
§ 205. Acquisition of the sovereignty in a vacant country.
§ 206. Another manner of acquiring the empire in a free country.
§ 207. How a nation acquires the property of a desert country.
§ 208. A question on this subject.
§ 209. Whether it be lawful to take possession of part of a country inhabited only by a few wandering tribes.
§ 210. Colonies.
CHAPTER 19: Of Our Native Country, and Several Things That Relate to It
§ 211. What is our country.
§ 212. Citizens and natives.
§ 213. Inhabitants.
§ 214. Naturalisation.
§ 215. Citizens’ children born in a foreign country.
§ 216. Children born at sea.
§ 217. Children born in the armies of the state, or in the house of its minister at a foreign court.
§ 218. Settlement.
§ 219. Vagrants.
§ 220. Whether a person may quit his country.
§ 221. How a person may absent himself for a time.
§ 222. Variation of the political laws in that respect:— they must be obeyed.
§ 223. Cases in which a citizen has a right to quit his country.
§ 224. Emigrants.
§ 225. Sources of their right.
§ 226. If the sovereign infringes their right, he injures them.
§ 227. Supplicants.
§ 228. Exile and banishment.
§ 229. The exile and the banished man have a right to live somewhere.
§ 230. Nature of that right.
§ 231. Duty of nations towards them.
§ 232. A nation cannot punish them for faults committed out of her territories.
§ 233. except such as affect the common safety of mankind.
CHAPTER 20: Of Public, Common, and Private Property
§ 234. What the Romans called res communes.
§ 235. Aggregate wealth of a nation, and its divisions.
§ 236. Two modes of acquiring public property.
§ 237. The income of the public property is naturally at the sovereign’s disposal.
§ 238. The nation may grant him the use and property of her common possessions.
§ 239. or allow him the domain, and reserve to herself the use of them.
§ 240. Taxes.
§ 241. The nation may reserve to herself the right of imposing them.
§ 242. Sovereign possessing that power.
§ 243. Duties of the prince with respect to taxes.
§ 244. Eminent domain annexed to the sovereignty.
§ 245. Dominion over public property.
§ 246. The sovereign may make laws respecting the use of things possessed in common.
§ 247. Alienation of the property of a corporation.
§ 248. Use of common property.
§ 249. How each member is to enjoy it.
§ 250. Right of anticipation in the use of it.
§ 251. The same right in another case.
§ 252. Preservation and repairs of common possessions.
§ 253. Duty and right of the sovereign in that respect.
§ 254. Private property.
§ 255. The sovereign may subject it to regulations of police.
(K. Notes: Police defined, 1756.
§ 256. Inheritances.
CHAPTER 21: Of the Alienation of the Public Property, or the Domain, and That of a Part of the State
§ 257. The nation may alienate its public property.
§ 258. Duties of the nation in that respect.
§ 259. Duties of the prince.
§ 260. He cannot alienate the public property.
§ 261. The nation may give him a right to do it.
§ 262. Rules on that subject with respect to treaties between nation and nation.
§ 263. Alienation of a part of the state.
§ 264. Rights of the dismembered party.
§ 265. Whether the prince has power to dismember the state.
CHAPTER 22: Of Rivers Streams, and Lakes
§ 266. A river that separates two territories.
§ 267. Bed of a river which is dried up or takes another course.
§ 268. Right of alluvion.
§ 269. Whether alluvion produces any change in the right to river.
§ 270. Consequence of a river changing its bed.
§ 271.Works tending to turn the current.
§ 272. or generally prejudicial to the rights of others.
§ 273. Rules relative to interfering rights.
§ 274. Lakes.
§ 275. Increase of a lake.
§ 276. Land formed on the banks of a lake.
§ 277. Bed of a lake dried up.
§ 278. Jurisdiction over lakes and rivers.
CHAPTER 23: Of the Sea
§ 279. The sea, and its use.
§ 280. Whether the sea can be possessed, and its dominion appropriated.
§ 281. Nobody has a right to appropriate to himself the use of the open sea.
§ 282. A nation attempting to exclude another, does her an injury.
§ 283. She even does an injury to all nations.
§ 284. She may acquire an exclusive right by treaties.
§ 285. but not by prescription and long use.
§ 286. unless by virtue of a tacit agreement.
§ 287. The sea near the coasts may become property.
§ 288. Another reason for appropriating the sea bordering on the coasts.
§ 289. How far that possession may extend.
§ 290. Shores and ports.
§ 291. Bays and straits.
§ 292. Straits in particular.
§ 293. Right to wrecks.
§ 294. A sea inclosed within the territories of a nation.
§ 295. The parts of the sea possessed by a sovereign are within his jurisdiction.
BOOK 2: Of a Nation Considered in its Relation to Others
CHAPTER 1: Of the Common Duties of a Nation Towards Others; Or, of the Offices of Humanity Between Nations
§ 1. Foundation of the common and mutual duties of nations.
§ 2. Offices of humanity, and their foundation.
§ 3. General principle of all the mutual duties of nations.
§ 4. Duties of a nation for the preservation of others.
§ 5. She is bound to assist a nation afflicted with famine or any other calamity.
§ 6. She is bound to contribute to the perfection of other states.
§ 7. but not by force.
§ 8. The right to require the offices of humanity.
§ 9. The right of judging whether they are to be granted,.
§ 10. A nation is not to compel another to perform those offices of which the refusal is no wrong.
§ 11. Mutual love of nations.
§ 12. Each nation is bound to cultivate the friendship of others.
§ 13. to perfect herself with a view to the advantage of others, and to set them good examples.
§ 14. to take care of their glory.
§ 15. Difference of religion ought not to preclude the offices of humanity.
§ 16. Rule and measure of the offices of humanity.
§ 17. Particular limitation with respect to the prince.
§ 18. No nation ought to injure others.
§ 19. Offences.
§ 20. Bad custom of the ancients.
CHAPTER 2: Of the Mutual Commerce Between Nations
§ 21. General obligation of nations to carry on mutual commerce.
§ 22. They are bound to favour trade.
§ 23. Freedom of trade.
§ 24. Right of trading, belonging to nations.
§ 25. Each nation is sole judge of the propriety of commerce on her own part.
§ 26. Necessity of commercial treaties.
§ 27. General rule concerning those treaties.
§ 28. Duty of nations in making such treaties.
§ 29. Perpetual or temporary treaties, or treaties revocable at pleasure.
§ 30. Nothing contrary to the tenor of a treaty can be granted to a third party.
§ 31. How far lawful to give up by treaty the liberty of trading with other nations.
§ 32. A nation may restrict her commerce in favour of another nation.
§ 33. A nation may appropriate to herself a particular branch of trade.
§ 34. Consuls.
CHAPTER 3: Of the Dignity and Equality of Nations — of Titles and Other Marks of Honor
§ 35. Dignity of nations or sovereign states.
§ 36. Their equality.
§ 37. Precedency.
§ 38. The form of government is foreign to this question.
§ 39. A state ought to retain her rank, notwithstanding any changes in the form of her government.
§ 40. Treaties and established customs are to be observed in this respect.
§ 41. Name and honours given by the nation to her conductor.
§ 42. Whether a sovereign may assume what title and honours he pleases.
§ 43. Right of other nations in that respect.
§ 44. Their duty.
§ 45. How titles and honours may be secured.
§ 46.We must conform to general custom.
§ 47. Mutual respect due by sovereigns to each other.
§ 48. How a sovereign ought to maintain his dignity.
CHAPTER 4: Of The Right to Security, And The Effects of The Sovereignty And Independence of Nations
§ 49. Right to security.
§ 50. It produces the right of resistance.
§ 51. and that of obtaining reparation.
§ 52. and the right of punishing.
§ 53. Right of all nations against a mischievous people.
§ 54. No nation has a right to interfere in the government of another state.
§ 55. One sovereign cannot make himself judge of the conduct of another.
§ 56. How far lawful to interfere in a quarrel between a sovereign and his subjects.
§ 57. Right of opposing the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of government.
§ 58. The same right with respect to religion.
§ 59. No nation can be constrained in religious concerns.
§ 60. Offices of humanity in these matters:— missionaries.
§ 61. Circumspection to be used.
§ 62. What a sovereign may do in favour of those who profess his religion in another state.
CHAPTER 5: Of the Observance of Justice Between Nations
§ 63. Necessity of the observance of justice in human society.
§ 64. Obligation of all nations to cultivate and observe justice.
§ 65. Right of refusing to submit to injustice.
§ 66. This right is a perfect one.
§ 67. It produces—the right of self-defence.
§ 68. the right of doing ourselves justice.
§ 69. The right of punishing injustice.
§ 70. Right of all nations against one that openly despises justice.
CHAPTER 6: Of the Concern a Nation May Have in the Actions of Her Citizens
§ 71. The sovereign ought to revenge the injuries of the state, and to protect the citizens.
§ 72. He must not suffer his subjects to offend other nations or their citizens.
§ 73. The acts of individuals not imputable to the nation.
§ 74. unless she approve or ratify them.
§ 75. Conduct to be pursued by the offended party.
§ 76. Duty of the aggressor’s sovereign.
§ 77. If he refuses justice, he becomes a party in the fault and offence.
§ 78. Another case in which the nation is guilty of the crimes of the citizens.
CHAPTER 7: Effects of the Domain Between Nations
§ 79. General effect of the domain.
§ 80. What is comprehended in the domain of a nation.
§ 81. The property of the citizens is the national property with respect to foreign states.
§ 82. A consequence of that principle.
§ 83. Connection of the domain of the nation with the sovereignty.
§ 84. Jurisdiction.
§ 85. Effects of the jurisdiction in foreign countries.
§ 86. Desert and uncultivated places.
§ 87. Duty of the nation in that respect.
§ 88. Right of possessing things that have no owner.
§ 89. Rights granted to another nation.
§ 90. Not allowable to expel a nation from the country she inhabits.
§ 91. nor to extend by violence the bounds of empire.
§ 92. The limits of territories ought to be carefully ascertained.
§ 93. Violation of territory.
§ 94. Prohibition to enter the territory.
§ 95. A country possessed by several nations at the same time.
§ 96. A country possessed by a private person.
§ 97. Independent families in a country.
§ certain rights, in a vacant country.
CHAPTER 8: Rules with Respect to Foreigners
§ 99. General idea of the conduct the state ought to observe towards foreigners.
§ 100. Entering the territory.
§ 101. Foreigners are subject to the laws.
§ 102. and punishable according to the laws.
§ 103. Who is the judge of their disputes.
§ 104. Protection due to foreigners.
§ 105. Their duties.
§ 106. To what burthens they are subject.
§ 107. Foreigners continue members of their own nation.
§ 108. The state has no right over the person of a foreigner.
§ 109. nor over his property.
§ 110. Who are the heirs of a foreigner.
§ 111.Will of a foreigner.
§ 112. Escheatage.
§ 113. The right of traite foraine.
§ 114. Immovable property possessed by an alien.
§ 115. Marriages of aliens.
CHAPTER 9: Of the Rights Retained by All Nations after the Introduction of Domain and Property
§ 116. What are the rights of which men cannot be deprived.
§ 117. Right still remaining from the primitive state of communion.
§ 118. Right retained by each nation over the property of others.
§ 119. Right of necessity.
§ 120. Right of procuring provisions by force.
§ 121. Right of making use of things belonging to others.
§ 122. Right of carrying off women.
§ 123. Right of passage.
§ 124. and of procuring necessaries.
§ 125. Right of dwelling in a foreign country.
§ 126. Things, of which the use is inexhaustible.
§ 127. Right of innocent use.
§ 128. Nature of that right in general.
§ 129. and in cases not doubtful.
§ 130. Exercise of that right between nations.
CHAPTER 10: How a Nation Is to Use Her Right of Domain, in Order to Discharge Her Duties Towards Other Nations, with Respect to the Innocent Use of Things
§ 131. General duty of the proprietor.
§ 132. Innocent passage.
§ 133. Securities may be required.
§ 134. Passage of merchandisev135. Residence in the country.
§ 136. How we are to act towards foreigners who desire a perpetual residence.
§ 137. Right accruing from a general permission.
§ 138. A right granted as a favour.
§ 139. The nation ought to be courteous.
CHAPTER 11: Of Usucaption and Prescription Among Nations LET us conclude what relates to domain and property with an examination of a celebrated question on which the learned are much divided. It is asked whether usucaption and prescription can take place between independent nations and states.
§ 140. Definition of usucaption and prescription.
§ 140. Definition of usucaption and prescription.
§ 141. Usucaption and prescription derived from the law of nature.
§ 142. What foundation is required for ordinary prescription.
§ 143. Immemorial prescription.
§ 144. Claimant alleging reasons for his silence.
§ 145. Proprietor sufficiently shewing that he does not mean to abandon his right.
§ 146. Prescription founded on the actions of the proprietor.
§ 147. Usucaption and prescription take place between nations.
§ 148. More difficult, between nations, to found them on a presumptive desertion.
§ 149. Other principles that enforce prescription.
§ 150. Effects of the voluntary law of nations on this subject.
§ 151. Law of treaties, or custom, in this matter.
CHAPTER 12: Of Treaties of Alliance, and Other Public Treaties
§ 152. Nature of treaties.
§ 153. Compacts, agreements, or conventions.
§ 154. By whom treaties are made.
§ 155. Whether a state under protection may make treaties.
§ 156. Treaties concluded by proxies or plenipotentiaries.
§ 157. Validity of treaties.
§ 158. Injury does not render them void.
§ 159. Duty of nations in that respect.
§ 160. Nullity of treaties which are pernicious to the state.
§ 161. Nullity of treaties made for an unjust or dishonest purpose.
§ 162. Whether an alliance may be contracted with those who do not profess the true religion.
§ 163. Obligation to observe treaties.
§ 164. The violation of a treaty is an act of injustice.
§ 165. Treaties cannot be made, contrary to those already existing.
§ 166. How treaties may be concluded with several nations with the same view.
§ 167. The more ancient ally entitled to a preference.
§ 168.We owe no assistance in an unjust war.
§ 169. General division of treaties:—those that relate to things already due by the law of nature.
§ 170. Collision of those treaties with the duties we owe to ourselves.
§ 171. Treaties in which we barely promise to do no injury.
§ 172. Treaties concerning things that are not naturally due:—equal treaties.
§ 173. Obligation to preserve equality in treaties.
§ 174. Difference between equal treaties and equal alliances.
§ 175. Unequal treaties, and unequal alliances.
§ 176. An alliance with diminution of sovereignty may annul preceding treaties.
§ 177.We ought, as much as possible, to avoid making unequal alliances.
§ 178. Mutual duties of nations with respect to unequal alliances.
§ 179. in alliances where the inequality is on the side of the more powerful party.
§ 180. How inequality of treaties and alliances may be conformable to the law of nature.
§ 181. Inequality imposed by way of punishment.
§ 182. Other kinds, of which we have spoken elsewhere.
§ 183. Personal and real treaties.
§ 184. Naming the contracting parties in the treaty does not render it personal.
§ 185. An alliance made by a republic is real.
§ 186. Treaties concluded by kings or other monarchs.
§ 187. Perpetual treaties, and those for a certain time.
§ 188. Treaties made for the king and his successors.
§ 189. Treaties made for the good of the kingdom.
§ 190. How presumption ought to be founded in doubtful cases.
§ 191. The obligations and rights resulting from a real treaty pass to the successors.
§ 192. Treaties accomplished once for all, and perfected.
§ 193. Treaties already accomplished on the one part.
§ 194. The personal alliance expires if one of the parties ceases to reign.
§ 195. Treaties in their own nature personal.
§ 196. Alliance concluded for the defence of the king and royal family.
§ 197. Obligation of a real alliance, when the allied king is deposed.
CHAPTER 13: Of the Dissolution and Renewal of Treaties1
§ 198. Expiration of alliances made for a limited time.
§ 199. Renewal of treaties.
§ 200. How a treaty is dissolved, when violated by one of the contracting parties.
§ 201. The violation of one treaty does not cancel another.
§ 202. The violation of one article in a treaty may cancel the whole.
§ 203. The treaty is void by the destruction of one of the contracting powers.
§ 204. Alliances of a state that has afterwards put herself under the protection of another.
§ 205. Treaties dissolved by mutual consent.
CHAPTER 14: Of Other Public Conventions, — of Those That Are Made by Subordinate Powers, — Particularly of the Agreement Called in Latin Sponsio, — and of Conventions of Sovereigns with Private Persons
§ 206. Conventions made by sovereigns..
§ 207. Those made by subordinate powers.
§ 208. Treaties concluded by a public person, without orders from the sovereign, or without sufficient powers.
§ 209. The agreement called sponsio.
§ 210. The state is not bound by such an agreement.
§ 211. To what the promiser is bound when it is disavowed.
§ 212. To what the sovereign is bound.
§ 213. Private contracts of the sovereign.
§ 214. Contracts made by him with private persons, in the name of the state.
§ 215. They are binding on the nation, and on his successors.
§ 216. Debts of the sovereign and the state.
§ 217. Donations of the sovereign, 228.
CHAPTER 15: Of the Faith of Treaties
§ 218. What is sacred among nations.
§ 219. Treaties sacred between nations.
§ 220. The faith of treaties is sacred.
§ 221. He who violates his treaties, violates the law of nations.
§ 222. Right of nations against him who disregards the faith of treaties.
§ 223. The law of nations violated by the popes.
§ 224. This abuse authorised by princes.
§ 225. Use of an oath in treaties.—It does not constitute the obligation.
§ 226. It does not change the nature of obligations.
§ 227. It gives no pre-eminence to one treaty above another.
§ 228. It cannot give force to a treaty that is invalid.
§ 229. Asseverations.
§ 230. The faith of treaties does not depend on the difference of religion.
§ 231. Precaution to be taken in wording treaties.
§ 232. Subterfuges in treaties.
§ 233. An evidently false interpretation inconsistent with the faith of treaties.
§ 234. Faith tacitly pledged.
CHAPTER 16: Of Securities Given for the Observance of Treaties
§ 235. Guaranty.
§ 236. It gives the guarantee no right to interfere unasked in the execution of a treaty.
§ 237. Nature of the obligation it imposes.
§ 238. The guaranty cannot impair the rights of a third party.
§ 239. Duration of the guaranty.
§ 240. Treaties with surety.
§ 241. Pawns, securities, and mortgages.
§ 242. A nation’s right over what she holds as a pledge.
§ 243. How she is obliged to restore it.
§ 244. How she may appropriate it to herself.
§ 245. Hostages.
§ 246. What right we have over hostages.
§ 247. Their liberty alone is pledged.
§ 248. When they are to be sent back.
§ 249. Whether they may be detained on any other account.
§ 250. They may be detained for their own actions.
§ 251. Of the support of hostages.
§ 252. A subject cannot refuse to be a hostage.
§ 253. Rank of the hostages.
§ 254. They ought not to make their escape.
§ 255. Whether a hostage who dies is to be replaced.
§ 256. Substitute for a hostage.
§ 257. Hostage succeeding to the crownv258. The liability of the hostage ends with the treaty.
§ 259. The violation of the treaty is an injury done to the hostages.
§ 260. The fate of the hostage when he who has given him fails in his engagements.
§ 261. Right founded on custom.
CHAPTER 17: Of the Interpretation of Treaties
§ 262. Necessity of establishing rules of interpretation.
§ 263. First general maxim—it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.
§ 264. Second general maxim—if he who could and ought to have explained himself, has not done it, it is to his own detriment.
§ 265. Third general maxim—neither of the contracting parties has a right to interpret the treaty according to his own fancy.
§ 266. Fourth general maxim—what is sufficiently declared, is to be taken for true.
§ 267.We ought to attend rather to the words of the person promising, than to those of the party stipulating.
§ 268. Fifth general maxim—the interpretation ought to be made according to certain rules.
§ 269. The faith of treaties imposes an obligation to follow those rules.
§ 270. General rule of interpretation.
§ 271. The terms are to be explained conformably to common usage.
§ 272. Interpretation of ancient treaties.
§ 273. Quibbles on words.
§ 274. A rule on that subject.
§ 275. Mental reservations.
§ 276. Interpretation of technical terms.
§ 277. Terms whose signification admits of degrees.
§ 278. Figurative expressions.
§ 279. Equivocal expressions.
§ 280. The rule for these two cases.
§ 281. Not necessary to give a term the same sense every-where in the same deed.
§ 282.We ought to reject every interpretation which leads to an absurdity.
§ 283. or which renders the act null and void of effect.
§ 284. Obscure expressions interpreted by others more clear in the same author.
§ 285. Interpretation founded on the connection of the discourse.
§ 286. Interpretation drawn from the connection and relation of the things themselves.
§ 287. Interpretation founded on the reason of the deed.
§ 288. Where many reasons have concurred to determine the will.
§ 289. What constitutes a sufficient reason for an act of the will.
§ 290. Extensive interpretation founded on the reason of the act.
§ 291. Frauds tending to elude laws or promises.
§ 292. Restrictive interpretation.
§ 293. Its use, in order to avoid falling into absurdities, or into what is unlawful.
§ 294. or what is too severe and burthensome.
§ 295. How it ought to restrict the signification agreeably to the subject.
§ 296. How a change happening in the state of things may form an exception.
§ 297. Interpretation of a deed in unforeseen cases.
§ 298. Reasons arising from the possibility and not the existence of a thing.
§ 299. Expressions susceptible of an extensive and a limited sense.
§ 300. Things favourable, and things odious.
§ 301. What tends to the common advantage, and to equality, is favourable: the contrary is odious.
§ 302. What is useful to human society, is favourable: the contrary is odious.
§ 303. Whatever contains a penalty, is odious.
§ 304. Whatever renders a deed void, is odious.
§ 305. Whatever tends to change the present state of things, is odious: the contrary is favourable.
§ 306. Things of a mixed nature.
§ 307. Interpretation of favourable things.
§ 308. Interpretation of odious things.
§ 309. Examples.
§ 310. How we ought to interpret deeds of pure liberality.
§ 311. Collision of laws or treaties.
§ 312. First rule in cases of collision.
§ 313. Second rule.
§ 314. Third rule.
§ 315. Fourth rule.
§ 316. Fifth rule.
§ 317. Sixth rule.
§ 318. Seventh rule.
§ 319. Eighth rule.
§ 320. Ninth rule.
§ 321. Tenth rule.
§ 322. General remark on the manner of observing all the preceding rules.
CHAPTER 18: Of The Mode of Terminating Disputes Between Nations
§ 323. General direction on this subject. 324. Every nation is bound to give satisfaction respecting the just complaints of another.
§ 325. How nations may abandon their rights and just complaints.
§ 326. Means suggested by the law of nature, for terminating their disputes:—amicable accommodation,.
§ 327. Compromise.
§ 328. Mediation.
§ 329. Arbitration.
§ 330. Conferences and congresses.
§ 331. Distinction to be made between evident and doubtful cases.
§ 332. Essential rights, and those of less importance.
§ 333. How we acquire a right of recurring to force in a doubtful case.
§ 334. and even without attempting other measures.
§ 335. Voluntary law of nations on that subject.
§ 336. Equitable conditions to be offered.
§ 337. Possessor’s right in doubtful cases.
§ 338. How reparation of an injury is to be sought.
§ 339. Retaliation.
§ 340. Various modes of punishing, without having recourse to arms.
§ 341. Retortion.
§ 342. Reprisals.
§ 343. What is required to render them lawful.
§ 344. Upon what effects reprisals are made.
§ 345. The state is bound to compensate those who suffer by reprisals.
§ 346. The sovereign alone can order reprisals.
§ 347. Reprisals against a nation for actions of her subjects, and in favour of the injured subjects.
§ 348. but not in favour of foreigners.
§ 349. Those who have given cause for reprisals are bound to indemnify those who suffer by them.
§ 350. What may be deemed a refusal to do justice.
§ 351. Subjects arrested by way of reprisals.
§ 352. Our right against those who oppose reprisals.
§ 353. Just reprisals do not afford a just cause for war.
§ 354. How we ought to confine ourselves to reprisals, or at length proceed to hostilities.
BOOK 3: Of War
CHAPTER 1: Of War, — Its Different Kinds — and the Right of Making War
§ 1. Definition of war.
§ 2. Public war.
§ 3. Right of making war.
§ 4. It belongs only to the sovereign power.
§ 5. Defensive and offensive war.
CHAPTER 2: Of the Instruments of War, — the Raising of Troops, Etc., — Their Commanders, or the Subordinate Powers in War
§ 6. Instruments of war.
§ 7. Right of levying troops.
§ 8. Obligation of the citizens or subjects.
§ 9. Enlisting or raising of troops.
§ 10. Whether there be any exemptions from carrying arms.
§ 11. Soldiers’ pay and quarters.
§ 12. Hospitals for invalids.
§ 13. Mercenary soldiers.
§ 14. Rule to be observed in their enlistment.
§ 15. Enlisting in foreign countries.
§ 16. Obligation of soldiers.
§ 17. Military laws.
§ 18. Military discipline.
§ 19. Subordinate powers in war.
§ 20. How their promises bind the sovereign.
§ 21. In what cases their promises bind only themselves.
§ 22. Their assumption of an authority which they do not possess.
§ 23. How they bind their inferiors.
CHAPTER 3: Of the Just Causes of War
§ 24. War never to be undertaken without very cogent reasons..
§ 25. Justificatory reasons, and motives for making war.
§ 26. What is in general a just cause of war.
§ 27. What war is unjust.
§ 28. The object of war.
§ 29. Both justificatory reasons and proper motives requisite in undertaking a war.
§ 30. Proper motives—vicious motives.
§ 31.War undertaken upon just grounds, but from vicious motives.
§ 32. Pretexts.
§ 33.War undertaken merely for advantage.
§ 34. Nations who make war without reason or apparent motives.
§ 35. How defensive war is just or unjust.
§ 36. How it may become just against an offensive war which was originally just.
§ 37. How an offensive war is just in an evident cause.
§ 38. in a doubtful cause.
§ 39. War cannot be just on both sides.
§ 40. Sometimes reputed lawful.
§ 41.War undertaken to punish a nation.
§ 42. Whether the aggrandisement of a neighbouring power can authorise a war against him.
§ 43. Alone, and of itself, it cannot give a right to attack him.
§ 44. How the appearances of danger give that right.
§ 45. Another case more evident.
§ 46. Other allowable means of defence against a formidable power.
§ 47. Political equilibrium.
§ 48. Ways of maintaining it.
§ 49. How he that destroys the equilibrium, may be restrained, or even weakened.
§ 50. Behaviour allowable towards a neighbour preparing for war.
CHAPTER 4: Of the Declaration of War — and of War in Due Form
§ 51. Declaration of war.
§ 52. What it is to contain.
§ 53. It is simple or conditional.
§ 54. The right to make war ceases on the offer of equitable conditions.
§ 55. Formalities of a declaration of war.
§ 56. Other reasons for the necessity of its publication.
§ 57. Defensive war requires no declaration.
§ 58. When it may be omitted in an offensive war.
§ 59. It is not to be omitted by way of retaliation.
§ 60. Time of the declaration.
§ 61. Duty of the inhabitants on a foreign army’s entering a country before a declaration of war.
§ 62. Commencement of hostilities.
§ 63. Conduct to be observed towards the enemy’s subjects who are in the country at the time of the declaration of war.
§ 64. Publication of the war, and manifestoes.
§ 65. Decorum and moderation to be observed in the manifestoes.
§ 66. What is a lawful war in due form.
§ 67. It is to be distinguished from informal and unlawful war.
§ 68. Grounds of this distinction.
CHAPTER 5: Of the Enemy, and of Things Belonging to the Enemy
§ 69. Who is an enemy.
§ 70. All the subjects of the two states at war are enemies.
§ 71. and continue to be enemies in all places.
§ 72. Whether women and children are to be accounted enemies.
§ 73. Things belonging to the enemy.
§ 74. continue such every-where.
§ 75. Neutral things found with an enemy.
§ 76. Lands possessed by foreigners in an enemy’s country.
§ 77. Things due to the enemy by a third party.
CHAPTER 6: Of the Enemy's Allies — of Warlike Associations — of Auxiliaries and Subsidies
§ 78. Treaties relative to war.
§ 79. Defensive and offensive alliances.
§ 80. Difference between warlike alliances and defensive treaties.
§ 81. Auxiliary troops.
§ 82. Subsidies.
§ 83. When a nation is authorised to assist another.
§ 84. and to make alliances for war.
§ 85. Alliances made with a nation actually engaged in war.
§ 86. Tacit clause in every warlike alliance.
§ 87. To refuse succours for an unjust war, is no breach of alliance.
§ 88. What the casus foederis is.
§ 89. It never takes place in an unjust war.
§ 90. How it exists in a defensive war.
§ 91. and in a treaty of a guaranty.
§ 92. The succour is not due under an inability to furnish it, or when the public safety would be exposed.
§ 93. Other cases:—two of the parties in an alliance coming to a rupture.
§ 94. Refusal of the succours due in virtue of an alliance.
§ 95. The enemy’s associates.
§ 96. Those who make a common cause with the enemy are his associates.
§ 97. and those who assist him, without being obliged to it by treaties.
§ 98. or who are in an offensive alliance with him.
§ 99. How a defensive alliance associates with the enemy.
§ 100. Another case.
§ 101. In what case it does not produce the same effect.
§ 102. Whether it be necessary to declare war against the enemy’s associates.
CHAPTER 7: Of Neutrality — and the Passage of Troops Through a Neutral Country
§ 103. Neutral nations.
§ 104. Conduct to be pursued by a neutral nation.
§ 105. An ally may furnish the succour due from him, and remain neuter.
§ 106. Right of remaining neuter.
§ 107. Treaties of neutrality.
§ 108. Additional reason for making those treaties.
§ 109. Foundation of the rules of neutrality.
§ 110. How levies may be allowed, money lent, and every kind of things sold, without a breach of neutrality.
§ 111. Trade of neutral nations with those which are at war.
§ 112. Contraband goods.
§ 113. Whether such goods may be confiscated.
§ 114. Searching neutral ships.
§ 115. Enemy’s property on board a neutral ship.
§ 116. Neutral property on board an enemy’s ship.
§ 117. Trade with a besieged town.
§ 118. Impartial offices of neutrals.
§ 119. Passage of troops through a neutral country.
§ 120. Passage to be asked.
§ 121. It may be refused for good reasons.
§ 122. In what case it may be forced.
§ 123. The fear of danger authorises a refusal.
§ 124. or a demand of every reasonable security.
§ 125. Whether always necessary to give every kind of security required.
§ 126. Equality to be observed towards both parties, as to the passage.
§ 127. No complaint lies against a neutral state for granting a passage.
§ 128. That state may refuse it from fear of the resentment of the opposite party.
§ 129. and lest her country should become the theatre of war.
§ 130. What is included in the grant of passage.
§ 131. Safety of the passage.
§ 132. No hostility to be committed in a neutral country.
§ 133. Neutral country not to afford a retreat to troops, that they may again attack their enemies.
§ 134. Conduct to be pursued by troops passing through a neutral country.
§ 135. A passage may be refused for a war evidently unjust.
CHAPTER 8: Of the Rights of Nations in War, — And, First, of What We Have a Right to Do, and What We Are Allowed to Do to the Enemy's Person, in a Just War
§ 136. General principles of the rights against an enemy in a just war.
§ 137. Difference between what we have a right to do, and what is barely allowed to be done with impunity between enemies.
§ 138. The right to weaken an enemy by every justifiable method.
§ 139. The right over the enemy’s person.
§ 140. Limits of that right:—an enemy not to be killed after ceasing to resist.
§ 141. A particular case, in which quarter may be refused.
§ 142. Reprisals.
§ 143. Whether a governor of a town can be punished with death for an obstinate defence.
§ 144. Fugitives and deserters.
§ 145.Women, children, the aged, and sick.
§ 146. Clergy, men of letters.
§ 147. Peasants, and, in general, all who do not carry arms.
§ 148. The right of making prisoners of war.
§ 149. A prisoner of war not to be put to death.
§ 150. How prisoners of war are to be treated.
§ 151. Whether prisoners, who cannot be kept or fed, may be put to death.
§ 152. Whether prisoners of war may be made slaves.
§ 153. Exchange and ransom of prisoners.
§ 154. The state is bound to procure their release.
§ 155. Whether an enemy may lawfully be assassinated or poisoned.
§ 156. Whether poisoned weapons may be used in war.
§ 157. Whether springs may be poisoned.
§ 158. Disposition to be entertained towards an enemy.
§ 159. Tenderness for the person of a king who is in arms against us.
CHAPTER 9: Of the Right of War, with Regard to Things Belonging to the Enemy
§ 160. Principles of the right over things belonging to the enemy.
§ 161. The right of seizing them.
§ 162. What is taken from the enemy by way of penalty.
§ 163. What is with-held from him, in order to oblige him to give just satisfaction.
§ 164. Booty.
§ 165. Contributions.
§ 166.Waste and destruction.
§ 167. Ravaging and burning.
§ 168. What things are to be spared.
§ 169. Bombarding towns.
§ 170. Demolition of fortresses.
§ 171. Safeguards.
§ 172. General rule of moderation, respecting the evil which may be done to an enemy.
§ 173. Rule of the voluntary law of nations on the same subject.
CHAPTER 10: Of Faith Between Enemies, — of Stratagems, Artifices in War, Spies, and Some Other Practices
§ 174. Faith to be sacred between enemies. 175. What treaties are to be observed between enemies.
§ 176. On what occasions they may be broken.
§ 177. Lies.
§ 178. Stratagems and artifices in war.
§ 179. Spies.
§ 180. Clandestine seduction of the enemy’s people.
§ 181. Whether the offers of a traitor may be accepted.
§ 182. Deceitful intelligence.
CHAPTER 11: Of the Sovereign Who Wages an Unjust War
§ 183. An unjust war gives no right whatever.
§ 184. Great guilt of the sovereign who undertakes it.
§ 185. His obligations.
§ 186. Difficulty of repairing the injury he has done.
§ 187. Whether the nation and the military are bound to any thing.
CHAPTER 12: Of the Voluntary Law of Nations, as it Regards the Effects of Regular Warfare, Independently of the Justice of the Cause
§ 188. Nations not rigidly to enforce the law of nature against each other.
§ 189. Why they are bound to admit the voluntary law of nations.
§ 190. Regular war, as to its effects, is to be accounted just on both sides.
§ 191. Whatever is permitted to one party, is so to the other.
§ 192. The voluntary law gives no more than impunity to him who wages an unjust war.
CHAPTER 13: Of Acquisitions by War, and Particularly of Conquests
§ 193. How war is a method of acquisition.
§ 194. Measure of the right it gives.
§ 195. Rules of the voluntary law of nations.
§ 196. Acquisition of movable property.
§ 197. Acquisition of immovables,—or conquest.
§ 198. How to transfer them validly.
§ 199. Conditions on which a conquered town is acquired.
§ 200. Lands of private persons.
§ 201. Conquest of the whole state.
§ 202. To whom the conquest belongs.
§ 203. Whether we are to set at liberty a people whom the enemy had unjustly conquered.
CHAPTER 14: Of the Right of Postliminium
§ 204. Definition of the right of postliminium 205. Foundation of that right.
§ 206. How it takes effect.
§ 207. Whether it takes effect among the allies.
§ 208. Of no validity in neutral nations.
§ 209. What things are recoverable by that right.
§ 210. Of those who cannot return by the right of postliminium.
§ 211. They enjoy that right when retaken.
§ 212. Whether that right extends to their property alienated by the enemy.
§ 213. Whether a nation that has been entirely subdued can enjoy the right of postliminium.
§ 214. Right of postliminium for what is restored at the peace.
§ 215. and for things ceded to the enemy.
§ 216. The right of postliminium does not exist after a peace.
§ 217. Why always in force for prisoners.
§ 218. They are free even by escaping into a neutral country.
§ 219. How the rights and obligations of prisoners subsist.
§ 220. Testament of a prisoner of war.
§ 221. Marriage.
§ 222. Regulations established by treaty or custom, respecting postliminium.
CHAPTER 15: Of the Right of Private Persons in War
§ 223. Subjects cannot commit hostilities without the sovereign's order.
(K. Notes: In these united States of America, our government is subject to the will of the governed people; in accord with The Declaration and The Constitution. The body of the people is not subject to the will of the government.
§ 224. That order may be general or particular.
§ 225. Source of the necessity of such an order.
§ 226. Why the law of nations should have adopted this rule.
§ 227. Precise meaning of the order.
§ 228. What may be undertaken by private persons, presuming on the sovereign’s will.
§ 229. Privateers.
§ 230. Volunteers.
§ 231. What soldiers and subalterns may do.
§ 232. Whether the state is bound to indemnify the subjects for damages sustained in war.
CHAPTER 16: Of Various Conventions Made During the Course of the War
§ 233. Truce and suspension of arms.
§ 234. does not terminate the war.
§ 235. A truce is either partial or general.
§ 236. General truce for many years.
§ 237. By whom those agreements may be concluded.
§ 238. The sovereign’s faith engaged in them.
§ 239. When the truce begins to be obligatory.
§ 240. Publication of the truce.
§ 241. Subjects contravening the truce.
§ 242. Violation of the truce.
§ 243. Stipulation of a penalty against the infractor.
§ 244. Time of the truce.
§ 245. Effects of a truce:—what is allowed, or not, during its continuance.—First rule—Each party may do at home what they have a right to do in time of peace.
§ 246. Second rule—Not to take advantage of the truce in doing what hostilities would have prevented.
§ 247. for instance, continuing the works of a siege, or repairing breaches.
§ 248. or introducing succours.
§ 249. Distinction of a particular case.
§ 250. Retreat of an army during a suspension of hostilities.
§ 251. Third rule—Nothing to be attempted in contested places, but every thing to be left as it was.
§ 252. Places quitted or neglected by the enemy.
§ 253. Subjects inclined to revolt against their prince not to be received during the truce.
§ 254. much less to be solicited to treason.
§ 255. Persons or effects of enemies not to be seized during the truce.
§ 256. Right of postliminium during the truce.
§ 257. Intercourse allowed during a truce.
§ 258. Persons detained by unsurmountable obstacles after the expiration of the truce.
§ 259. Particular conditions added to truces.
§ 260. At the expiration of the truce, the war recommences without any new declaration.
§ 261. Capitulations; and by whom they may be concluded.
§ 262. Clauses contained in them.
§ 263. Observance of capitulations, and its utility.
§ 264. Promises made to the enemy by individuals.
CHAPTER 17: Of Safe-conducts and Passports, — With Questions on the Ransom of Prisoners of War
§ 265. Nature of safe-conducts and passports.
§ 266. From what authority they emanate.
§ 267. Not transferable from one person to another.
§ 268. Extent of the promised security.
§ 269. How to judge of the right derived from a safe-conduct.
§ 270. Whether it includes baggage and domestics.
§ 271. Safe-conduct granted to the father does not include his family.
§ 272. Safe-conduct given in general to any one and his retinue.
§ 273. Term of the safe-conduct.
§ 274. A person unavoidably detained beyond the term.
§ 275. The safe-conduct does not expire at the death of him who gave it.
§ 276. How it may be revoked.
§ 277. Safe-conduct, with the clause, “for such time as we shall “think fit.
§ 278. Conventions relating to the ransom of prisoners.
§ 279. The right of demanding a ransom may be transferred.
§ 280. What may annul the convention made for the rate of the ransom.
§ 281. A prisoner dying before payment of ransom.
§ 282. Prisoner released on condition of procuring the release of another.
§ 283. Prisoner retaken before he has paid his former ransom.
§ 284. Prisoner rescued before he has received his liberty.
§ 285. Whether the things which a prisoner has found means to conceal, belong to him.
§ 286. Hostage given for the release of a prisoner.
CHAPTER 18: Of Civil War
§ 287 Foundation of the sovereign's rights against the rebels.
§ 288. Who are rebels.
§ 289. Popular commotion, insurrection, sedition.
§ 290. How the sovereign is to suppress them.
§ 291. He is bound to perform the promises he has made to the rebels.
§ 292. Civil war.
§ 293. A civil war produces two independent parties.
§ 294. They are to observe the common laws of war.
§ 295. The effects of civil war distinguished according to cases.
§ 296. Conduct to be pursued by foreign nations.
BOOK 4: Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies
CHAPTER 1: Of Peace, and the Obligation to Cultivate it
§ l. What peace is.
§ 2. Obligation of cultivating it.
§ 3. The sovereign’s obligation in that respect.
§ 4. Extent of that duty.
§ 5. Disturbers of the public peace.
§ 6. How far war may be continued.
§ 7. Peace the end of war.
§ 8. General effects of peace.
CHAPTER 2: Treaties of Peace
§ 9. Definition of a treaty of peace.
§ 10. By whom it may be concluded.
§ 11. Alienations made by a treaty of peace.
§ 12. How the sovereign may, in a treaty, dispose of what concerns individuals.
§ 13. Whether a king who is a prisoner of war, can make a peace.
§ 14. Whether peace can be made with a usurper.
§ 15. Allies included in the treaty of peace.
§ 16. Associates to treat, each for himself.
§ 17. Mediation.
§ 18. On what footing peace may be concluded.
§ 19. General effect of the treaty of peace.
§ 20. Amnesty.
§ 21. Things not mentioned in the treaty.
§ 22. Things not included in the compromise or amnesty.
§ 23. Former treaties, mentioned or confirmed in the new, are a part of it.
CHAPTER 3: Of the Execution of the Treaty of Peace
§ 24. When the obligation of the treaty commences.
§ 25. Publication of the peace.
§ 26. Time of the execution.
§ 27. A lawful excuse to be admitted.
§ 28. The promise is void when the party to whom it was made has himself hindered the performance of it.
§ 29. Cessation of contributions.
§ 30. Products of the thing restored or ceded.
§ 31. In what condition things are to be restored.
§ 32. The interpretation of a treaty of peace is to be against the superior party.
§ 33. Names of ceded countries.
§ 34. Restoration not to be understood of those who have voluntarily given themselves up.
CHAPTER 4: Of the Observance and Breach of the Treaty of Peace
§ 35. The treaty of peace binds the nation and successors.
§ 36. It is to be faithfully observed.
§ 37. The plea of fear or force does not dispense with the observance.
§ 38. How many ways a treaty of peace may be broken.
§ 39. by a conduct contrary to the nature of every treaty of peace.
§ 40. To take up arms for a fresh cause is no breach of the treaty of peace.
§ 41. A subsequent alliance with an enemy is likewise no breach of the treaty.
§ 42. Why a distinction is to be made between a new war and a breach of the treaty.
§ 43. Justifiable self-defence is no breach of the treaty.
§ 44. Causes of rupture on account of allies.
§ 45. The treaty is broken by what is contrary to its particular nature.
§ 46. by the violation of any article.
§ 47. The violation of a single article breaks the whole treaty.
§ 48. Whether a distinction may here be made between the more and the less important articles.
§ 49. Penalty annexed to the violation of an article.
§ 50. Studied delays.
§ 51. Unsurmountable impediments.
§ 52. Infractions of the treaty of peace by the subjects.
§ 53. or by allies.
§ 54. Right of the offended party against him who has violated the treaty.
CHAPTER 5: Of the Right of Embassy, or the Right of Sending and Receiving Public Ministers
§ 55. It is necessary that nations be enabled to treat and communicate together.
§ 56. They do that by the agency of public ministers.
§ 57. Every sovereign state has a right to send and receive public ministers.
§ 58. An unequal alliance, or a treaty of protection, does not take away that right.
§ 59. Right of the princes and states of the empire in that respect.
§ 60. Cities that have the right of banner
§ 61. Ministers of viceroys
§ 62. Ministers of the nation or of the regents during an interregnum.
§ 63. Sovereign molesting another in the exercise of the right of embassy.
§ 64. What is allowable in that respect in time of war
§ 65. The minister of a friendly power is to be received
§ 66. Resident ministers.
§ 67. Admission of an enemy’s ministers.
§ 68. Whether ministers may be received from or sent to a usurper.
CHAPTER 6: Of the Several Orders of Public Ministers — Of the Representative Character — and of the Honor Due to Ministers
§ 69. Origin of the several orders of public ministers.
§ 70. Representative character.
§ 71. Embassadors.
§ 72. Envoys.
§ 73. Residents.
§ 74. Ministers.
§ 75. Consuls, agents, deputies, commissioners
§ 76. Credentials.
§ 77. Instructions.
§ 78. Right of sending embassadors.
§ 79. Honours due to embassadors.
CHAPTER 7: Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers
§ 80. Respect due to public ministers.
§ 81. Their persons sacred and inviolable.
§ 82. Particular protection due to them.
§ 83. When it commences.
§ 84. What is due to them in the countries through which they pass.
§ 85. Embassadors going to an enemy’s country.
§ 86. Embassies between enemies.
§ 87. Heralds, trumpeters, and drummers.
§ 88. Ministers, trumpeters, &c. to be respected even in a civil war.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 90. Every thing which has the appearance of insult to them, must be avoided.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 91. By and to whom they may be sent.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 92. Independence of foreign ministers.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 93. How the foreign minister is to behave.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 94. How he may be punished for ordinary
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 95. for faults committed against the prince.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 96. Right of ordering away an embassador who is guilty, or justly suspected.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 97. Right of repressing him by force, if he behaves as an enemy.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 98. Embassador forming dangerous plots
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 99. What may be done to him according to the exigency of the case.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 100. Embassador attempting against the sovereign’s life.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 101. Two remarkable instances respecting the immunities of public ministers.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 102. Whether reprisals may be made on an embassador.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 103. Agreement of nations concerning the privileges of embassadors.
§ 89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.
§ 104. Free exercise of religion.
§ 105. Whether an embassador be exempted from all imposts.
§ 106. Obligation founded on use and custom.
§ 107. A minister whose character is not public.
§ 108. A sovereign in a foreign country.
§ 109. Deputies to the states.
CHAPTER 8: Of the Judge of Ambassadors in Civil Cases
§ 110. The ambassador is exempt from the civil jurisdiction of the country where he resides.
§ 111. How he may voluntarily subject himself to it.
§ 112. A minister who is a subject of the state where he is employed.
§ 113. Immunity of the minister extends to his property.
§ 114. The exemption cannot extend to effects belonging to any trade the minister may carry on.
§ 115. nor to immovable property which he possesses in the country.
§ 116. How justice may be obtained against an embassador.
CHAPTER 9: Of the Ambassador's House and Domestics
§ 117. The ambassador's house.
§ 118. Right of asylum.
§ 119. Exemption of an embassador’s carriages.
§ 120. of his retinue.
§ 121. of his wife and family.
§ 122. of the secretary of the embassy.
§ 123. of the embassador’s couriers and dispatches.
§ 124. The embassador’s authority over his retinue.
§ 125. When the rights of an embassador expire,
§ 126. Cases when new credentials are necessary.
§ 127. Conclusion.